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The intensification of the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, the conduct of military 
operations in the South-East region of the state, and the need for immediate defense 
reforms are among top state priorities for the Ukrainian government. The creation of the 
modern Ukrainian Army should be a product of a reformed defense planning system. 
Previous unsuccessful attempts at defense planning need to be acknowledged and not 
replicated. It is time for the Ukrainian defense institution to rid itself of Communist 
legacy concepts and adopt Western ones. 
The purpose of this research is to outline the key aspects of the problem of the 
existing defense planning and force management systems and define how they must, and 
can be, fundamentally reformed. In this effort, time is spent considering the utility of 
defense review to achieving this end via the identification of its strengths and pitfalls, to 
describe necessary changes of the existing legislation framework of defense planning and 
the need for corresponding changes in military institution, to analyze existing defense 
programs and suggest their restructuring for project management, and to ascertain how 
the now largely ignored IAS “Resource” could be used successfully in the future to 
support these objectives. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A.  IMPORTANCE AND PURPOSES ................................................................2 
B.  TASKS, OBJECT AND SUBJECT ................................................................3 
C.  PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY............................................................4 
D.  LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................6 
E.  ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY ...........................................................10 
II.  CHALLENGE OF DEFENSE PLANNING IN THE MINISTRY OF 
DEFENSE OF UKRAINE .........................................................................................13 
A.  DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC PLANNING .....................................15 
B.  MIDDLE-TERM DEFENSE PLANNING ..................................................20 
C.  ADVANCE OF SHORT-TERM PLANNING ............................................21 
D.  INSTITUTION ESTABLISHMENT OF MDU AND GS ..........................26 
1.  Development of Structures of the Ministry of Defense of 
Ukraine and the General Staff of Armed Forces of Ukraine .........26 
2.  Failures Associated with the Reformation of the Bodies of 
Military Authorities and their Activities .........................................30 
E.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................32 
III.  CONDUCTING DEFENSE REVIEWS: HOW IT SHOULD WORK AND 
WHY THEY DO NOT ACTUALLY WORK .........................................................35 
A.  EVOLUTION OF BRITISH DEFENSE REVIEW ....................................36 
B.  EVOLUTION OF THE USA DEFENSE REVIEW ...................................43 
C.  MISTAKE ANALYSIS OF CONDUCTED DEFENSE REVIEW IN 
MDU ................................................................................................................48 
D.  RANGE OF PROBLEMS IN MDU RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE MOU ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF 
THE DEFENCE REVIEW ...........................................................................55 
E.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................62 
IV.  INTERDEPENDENCE OF BUDGET AND DEFENSE PLANNING .................63 
A.  BUDGET AND DEFENSE PROGRAMS ...................................................64 
B.  ANALYSIS OF PLANNING AND EXECUTING FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES OF MDU ................................................................................69 
C.  SPECIAL FUND—UNCERTAINTY OF DEFENSE PLANNING ..........75 
D.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................78 
V.  ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE FORCE MANAGEMENT .........................................79 
A.  ESSENCE OF THE IAS “RESOURCE” ....................................................81 
B.  THE CAUSES OF IAS “RESOURCE” FAILURE ....................................85 
C.  QUESTION ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE IAS “RESOURCE” .......88 
D.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................95 
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONDUCTING DEFENSE PLANNING IN 
THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE. ..................................................97 
 viii
A.  LEGISLATION SHOULD SUPPORT TO CONDUCTING 
DEFENSE PLANNING .................................................................................97 
B.  PRIORITIES IN CONDUCTION OF DEFENSE REVIEW ..................100 
C.  CHALLENGE OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND INSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURE CHANGES ..........................................................................102 
D.  RESTRUCTURING OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS ..................................104 
1.  Defense Program Structure ............................................................105 
2.  Project Integrity ...............................................................................109 
E.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................110 
VII.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................113 
A.  SUMMARY AND STRUCTURE OF WORK ..........................................113 
B.  SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH .........................................115 
APPENDIX A.  FINANCIAL RESOURCES DURING 2006–2011 ................................117 
APPENDIX B.  PRESIDENTS OF UKRAINE VS. MINISTERS OF DEFENSE OF 
UKRAINE .................................................................................................................119 
APPENDIX C.  THE PROPOSED SCHEME OF IAS “RESOURCE” .........................123 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................125 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  The United Scheme of Defense Planning ........................................................53 
Figure 2.  List and Reciprocal Relationships between Procedures in the Process of 
Task Execution of Defense Review (Option). .................................................58 
Figure 3.  The Distribution of Capabilities Across Categories of the Life Cycle 
(option) .............................................................................................................61 
Figure 4.  Connection Between Clusters (Sub-Clusters) of Defense Planning to 
Budget Programs ..............................................................................................68 
Figure 5.  Share the Defense Budget of GDP 1992–2013 ................................................70 
Figure 6.  Defense Spending Category 2005–2014 ..........................................................70 
Figure 7.  Average Defense Spending Category 2005–2014. ..........................................71 
Figure 8.  Dynamic of Changing of Defense Expenditure and GDP 2000–2013 ............72 
Figure 9.  Defense Expenditure 1997–2012 .....................................................................73 
Figure 10.  Defense Expenditures 2006–2017 ...................................................................75 
Figure 11.  Structure of Special Fund of the MDU ............................................................76 
Figure 12.  Appropriation and Execution Distribution of Special Fund of Budget of 
the MDU During 2005–2013 ...........................................................................77 
Figure 13.  Rate of Execution of Special Funds of MDU Budget During 2005–2013 ......78 
Figure 14.  Functional Structure of the IAS “Resource” ....................................................83 
Figure 15.  Existing Scheme of Working IAS “Resource” ................................................89 
Figure 16.  Future Years Defense Program Structure of DOD ........................................105 
Figure 17.  Annual Defense Program Structure ...............................................................109 
Figure 18.  Transparent View of Project Cost Relevant for Making Decision ................110 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  Western vs Eastern Norms .................................................................................7 
Table 2.  Distribution of Expenditure of General Funds of the State Budget of 
Ukraine for 2014 for MDU, Thousand Hryvna ...............................................66 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AFU  Armed Forces of Ukraine 
AME Armament and military equipment 
ATO Anti-terrorism operation 
BUR Bottom-Up Review 
CECE Code of economical classification of expenditures 
CMU Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
DIC  Defense-industrial complex 
DPGSP Defense Policy and Global Strategy Paper 
DR Defense review 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GS General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IAS Information-analytical system 
IAS “Resource” Information-Analytical System for support of defense planning 
“Resource” 
MFU Ministry of Finance of Ukraine 
MDDMP Main Directorate of Defense and Mobilization Planning of the 
General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 
MDU Ministry of Defense of Ukraine 
MoD Ministry of Defense 
NSDCU National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine 
OMF Other military formations 
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 
PMD  Plan of Maintenance and Development of the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine 
R&D Research and development 
SDB  Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine till 2015 
SDR Strategic Defense Review 
SMO State military organization 
SPSR Strategic Defense and Security Review 
 xiv
TPMD Tentative Plan of Maintenance and Development of Armed Forces 
of Ukraine 




First of all, I owe my deepest gratitude from the bottom of my heart to my 
husband, Iurii, and my son, Olexii, for their patience, understanding, and support, even 
with the challenge of longtime separation; to my parents, who look after my son and give 
me the possibility to take this opportunity to study far away from home. 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to both my thesis advisors, Dr. Max 
Kidalov and Dr. Thomas D. Young, for their time and openness, patience and 
attentiveness, assistance and skillful guidance in guiding me to successful 
accomplishment. Their valuable experience and priceless advice helped me not just in my 
thesis but in my future work as well. 
I would like to give my deep appreciation to the faculty and staff of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Graduate School of Business & Public Policy and Department of 
National Security Affairs for the useful experience and important knowledge I obtained. 
My special thanks to the editor of my thesis, who spent long hours making it readable. 
I would also like to thank the International Programs Office for its outstanding 
trips and events, understanding, and hel  
Finally, my special thanks go to my colleagues and friends, especially Alex, who 
supported me with necessary information and sources during thesis research. 
 
 xvi




At the present time, among the most important priorities of foreign and domestic 
policy of Ukraine are the adoption of Euro-Atlantic integration by the president of 
Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, and the related defense sector reform according to European 
and NATO standards. Maintaining the proper level of defense of the state, law 
enforcement and combat readiness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) is the 
foundation of national interests and military-economic security. The current war in the 
Southeast of Ukraine confirms it.  
Creating a well-armed and equipped AFU is impossible without effective, well-
timed and opportune defense planning. A decade of existing defense planning in the AFU 
proves the necessity of improving planning and development basic coherence within the 
current planning and budget execution systems. The current system of defense planning 
in the Ministry of the Defense of Ukraine (MDU) requires fundamental reform at all 
levels: long, middle, and short. Currently, the AFU continues to work to improve the 
legal and regulatory framework for defense planning. Unfortunately, this work is based 
on Communist legacy concepts which are not linked, and are completely unconnected to 
the output of defense outcomes.  
The AFU plays a primary role in the societal, security, and economic reforms 
currently pursued by the Ukrainian State. However, the AFU should not be involved in 
all these reforms. The government should create such conditions for the MDU and the 
AFU that they are able to fulfill their tasks and be responsible for just the defense and 
security sphere. Today, there is a need for a more complete disclosure of the nature and 
values, an in-depth analysis of the activities of the military planning and support for the 
army, which is especially important in the context of the ongoing Anti-Terrorism 
Operation (ATO) in Eastern Ukraine. It is also vital to understand the gaps and mistakes 
in defense planning and force management which led to the lack of combat readiness in 
the AFU, and to chart the ways to repair and reverse those gaps and mistakes. 
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In this research study the questions of the theory and practice of military planning 
are investigated from the perspective of the formation, distribution, and use of defense 
expenditures during a series of reforms of the AFU over the past twenty-five years. 
Analyzing the formation of the defense budget and defense planning has practical value, 
not only for vital activity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but also for the national 
security sector as a whole, including its relationship with the defense industry. 
The relevance of the study is explained by the fact that effective and modern, 
output-driven defense planning has not been embraced at all and earlier attempts at such 
planning have not been based on the principles of a systematic approach that produces the 
desired outcome. Another issue is that the system of defense planning is not implemented 
throughout the entire state’s security sector (for example, the Border Guards Service, or 
the Interior Troops and the National Guard of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), but just in 
the AFU. This is the result of a lack of reasonable holistic concepts of reforming the 
AFU. Additional challenges include civil-military relations in the area of defense 
planning, and the lack of effective continuous feedback on planning and implementation.  
In effect, the current system of defense resource management of Ukraine is a 
contradiction in that the structure and scope of the defense budget do not meet the 
requirements of the armed forces to undertake combat operations. Thus, there are 
fundamental conceptual contradictions in the views and principles of providing the AFU. 
Twenty-three years after independence was the first time Ukrainian armed forces had to 
defend the nation within its own territory. This incursion allowed the MDU and The GS 
an opportunity to examine its existing system of defense planning in practice, and analyze 
its capacity and flexibility. 
A. IMPORTANCE AND PURPOSES 
The importance of this research is in the need to develop and explore the 
organizational and economic aspects of the defense planning system for the planned 
distribution and effective use of defense resources of the state to ensure military and 
economic security. There is a need to establish an effective system of defense planning 
and force management in the AFU, supported by a budgetary execution process, which 
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will allow the efficient use of limited financial resources of the MDU to meet its national 
defense and security objectives, and to continuously update the planning priorities and 
their implementation status at the national, Ministry, Force, and unit levels. 
In the current situation, it is very important to explore the economic-
organizational aspects of development of the defense planning system for the planned 
distribution and efficient use of state defense resources to ensure military and economic 
security. Currently, this is the basis for ensuring the defense capacity of Ukraine, and is 
especially an important element in the creation of a new military doctrine of Ukraine. 
The purposes of this research are (1) to outline the outstanding aspects of the 
general problems of improvement of the existing defense planning system, (2) to define 
the basic ways to overcome the problems, (3) to describe necessary changes of the 
existing legislation framework of defense planning, and (4) to revive the information-
analytical system for support of defense planning “Resource” (IAS “Resource”). 
B. TASKS, OBJECT AND SUBJECT 
This work produces a comprehensive analysis of the system of defense planning, 
and the study is organized to address the following tasks:  
1. A study of methodological foundations of the existing system of defense 
planning and prioritization of its development within the context of 
economic, security, and legal reforms in Ukraine.  
2. Elaboration of the nature of defense planning of the Ukrainian Army, 
along with justification of the principles of defense planning and 
amendments to the existing legislative base.  
3. Analysis of the mechanism of the defense review (DR) taking foreign into 
account. 
4. Analysis of conducting of the software “Information-Analytical System 
for Support of Defense Planning ‘Resource’” (IAS “Resource”) and 
providing a proposal about its further necessity. 
5. Development of proposals on the improvement of legislation on defense 
planning. 
6. Suggestion of interdependence of budget and defense planning. 
The object of the research is the system of civil-military, command, and economic 
relations in the process of implementing support of the AFU related to defense planning, 
assessment of the structures of the MDU and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of 
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Ukraine (GS), ascertainment of whether they work efficiently, and assessment of the 
failures of the IAS “Resource” and how to improve the efficiency of its use in order to 
enhance combat readiness. 
The subject of the research consists of the theoretical and methodological basis 
for the formation and realization of the components of the framework for defense 
planning for the prospective and during the implementation of the allocated expenditure 
for the current year. 
The theoretical basis of this work is the fundamental foundations of Western best 
practice in defense management; scientific works of domestic and foreign scholars and 
practitioners on issues of defense planning, budgeting, and legal issues of support of the 
AFU; a systematic approach to the study of economic processes and positions in which 
financial and economic relations are viewed as a system phenomenon. 
C. PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY 
The present day defense sphere of Ukraine has a system of laws that has been 
adopted in different periods of independence. All these laws have not been adopted in a 
clear hierarchical order, lack coherence and clarity, and are almost exclusively not 
focused on producing defense outcomes. Rather, they focus on reinforcing the 
centralization of control of everything. There is no clarity on the previous indicators’ 
ultimate goal, the choice of priorities to achieve it, the operating parameters of facilities 
management, and operation of boundaries and liability of implementation. 
Another problem is the lack of a statutory control mechanism that determines the 
object and scope of control and liability of its implementation. A consequence of this 
situation is the existence of a number of legal provisions, legislative acts (usually 
declarative) which will never be executed and are unlikely to be reinforced. Involvement 
of NATO-experts in the development of laws and programs, specifically at the 
international level, in order to increase the degree of testing instruments, unfortunately 
did not address these issues. Mostly, this problem is due to attempts at building a defense 
planning system on an existing legacy conceptual base. Long-term non-intervention in 
 5
the situation contributed to the reduction in military security and the further decline of 
defense planning in general. 
The next problem arises from using the existing software IAS “Resource.” It was 
developed to create a database for all military units and provide analysis and modeling of 
alternative structures of individual units and armed forces as a whole, including financial 
indicators. However, the IAS “Resource” does not have specific standards and norms. Its 
computation basis is premised on previous reports. Moreover, reporting dates of the IAS 
“Resource” do not agree with planning dates, when this system should provide support. 
The problem of integration defense and budget planning in a single system arose 
as far back as 2007. The situation when “there is no direct connection between defense 
and budget programs … creates the problem in assessing the efficiency of using 
budgetary funds.”1 Thus, the integration defense and budget planning is still a problem. 
Moreover, inefficient distribution and the stuffing of defense programs create a non-
transparent and erratic budget.  
The next problem is personnel reduction that leads to a maldistribution in staff 
structure specialists in force management in the branches of the AFU, the MDU, and the 
GS. Thus, key force management functions throughout the armed forces need cardinal 
changes. Moreover, imprudent policies that have produced reductions and inefficient 
organization of all branches of the AFU, the MDU, and the GS have produced 
dysfunctionality throughout the entire defense institution. Finally, attempts to implement 
Western concepts, assumptions, and institutional logic without retiring their Communist 
legacy counterparts have resulted in continuing failure of the defense institution to 
produce envisaged defense outcomes.  
The study used the following methods: analysis in the study of the structure and 
dynamics of the work of units of defense planning of the AFU; historical and systematic 
in the study of the relationship between defense and budget planning; comparative 
analysis of the documents in the study of scientific and special literature and a legislative 
                                                 
1 I.M. Aparshin and M. M. Denegkin, “Views on the Integration of Defense and Budget Planning of 
the Armed Forces of Ukraine Into a Single System,” Science and Defense, no 1 (2007): 24. 
http://www.nio.mil.gov.ua/pdf/2007-1.pdf. 
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base; and different methods of observation, grouping, classification, and graphical 
representation of results. Also the personal experience of the author—who has been 
working in the Main Directorate of Defense and Mobilization Planning of the GS 
(MDDNP) since its beginning—was used in this research. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since the Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the Ukrainian army has been 
downsizing and has suffered political and financial neglect. The Orange Revolution in 
2004 introduced a new phase of reforming the AFU:  
The nature of the revolution in Ukraine, which ushered in a democratically 
elected pro-Western government that actively sought Euro-Atlantic 
integration, shaped the model of military reform adopted in Ukraine. In 
2005 the Ukrainian President [V. Yushchenko] stated that he believed 
NATO membership to be in Ukraine’s national interest. A strategy of 
military imitation included the adoption of dominant Western values and 
concepts such as the development of agile, mobile, high tech, flexible, 
deployable and interoperable professional forces. For V. Yushchenko, this 
strategy would create a virtuous circle where military reform would not 
only help facilitate foreign policy goals but would also have the added 
benefit of developing an effective and efficient fighting force in Ukraine. 
Military imitation would also allow Ukraine to build a military that 
reflects and upholds its democratic values.2    
In 2004, Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic orientation led to the creation of a force 
management system needed to support Western-style defense planning. In this direction, 
some steps were taken in that the system (1) created a legislation framework to support 
defense planning and force management; (2) improved transparency; and (3) improved 
the institutional mechanism for implementation, especially in terms of the differentiation 
between planning and execution of the MDU and the GS. However, the system was built 
on Eastern standards and this made the attempt to shift to Western standards almost 
impossible. Table 1 shows Western norms in comparison with Communist legacy ones. It 
is clear that using Western norms without completely replacing Eastern ones does not 
create progress. 
                                                 
2 Debora Sanders, “Ukraine Military Reform: Building a Paradigm Army,” The Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies, 21, no. 4 (December, 2008): 601, DOI: 10.1080/13518040802497341. 
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Table 1.   Western vs Eastern Norms3 
Western norms Eastern norms 
Practice focused, Theory checks and 
underpins 
Party Doctrine focused (disguised as 
theory); Practice becomes irrelevant 
De-centralized execution Centralized execution 
Results oriented Process oriented 
Future oriented Past oriented 
Low context High context 
Serve the troops Ignore troop’s welfare 
Take chances Uncertainty avoidance 
Initiative rewarded Initiative is condemned 
Lying is not an option Lying is not a sin 
Failure is part of learning Failure is not an option 
The work is a profession The work is for personal reward 
 
In order to understand the failure of defense planning, it is necessary to agree on a 
definition: What is “planning”? Mintzberg4 gives several definitions: (1) “future 
thinking;”5 (2) “controlling the future;”6 (3) “decision making;”7 (4) integrated decision 
making;”8 and (5) “a formalized procedure to produce an articulated result, in the form of 
an integrated system of decisions.”9 In addition, he suggests why organizations have to 
                                                 
3 Thomas-Durell Young, The Persistence of Pernicious Legacies: Why Defense Reform Has Failed in 
Central and Eastern Europe, (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, not dated 2012). 
4 Henry Mintzberg. The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, 
Planners. (New York: Toronto: Free Press, 1994). https://libsearch.nps.edu/vufind/Record/231356. 
5 Ibid., 7. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 9. 
8 Ibid., 11. 
9 Ibid., 13. 
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plan: (1) “to coordinate their activities;”10 (2) “to ensure that the future is taken into 
account…in three basic ways: 1. preparing for the inevitable 2. preempting the 
undesirable 3. Controlling the controllable;”11 (3) “to be ‘rational’”;12 (4) “to control.”13  
However, in any case, planning is closely coupled with resources, namely money. 
In addition, defense planning completely depends on a state’s economy. Hitch and 
McKean14 explain “a way of looking at military problem … as … [an] economic problem 
in the efficient allocation and use of resources.”15 This book became a classical work 
even in the Soviet Union; nevertheless, it was and still is difficult to understand because 
of the misunderstanding between Western norms and the lack of thinking “out-of-the-
box” in Communist legacy defense institutions. Unfortunately, all post-Soviet countries 
had and still have difficulty understanding Western norms, mostly because of the heritage 
of the old education system that has yet to be reformed. 
Strategic misunderstanding is a problem not just in Ukraine. Mintzberg 
principally associates strategy with a plan. It is interesting to notice how Grattan defines 
and pictures the strategy: “Fundamentally, strategy is a series of measures adopted to 
achieve a stated aim.”16 He cites Carroll—the conversation between Alice and the 
Cheshire Cat—to show an understanding of strategy: 
“‘Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?’ 
‘That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,’ said the Cat. 
‘I don’t much care where –,’ said Alice. 
‘Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,’ said the Cat.” 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 16. 
11 Ibid., 17. 
12 Ibid., 18. 
13 Ibid., 19. 
14 Charles Johnston Hitch and Roland N. McKean. The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age. 
(New York: Atheneum, 1975). https://libsearch.nps.edu/vufind/Record/314842/Description#tabnav. 
15 Ibid., v. 
16 Robert F. Grattan, Strategic Review: The Process of Strategy Formulation in Complex 
Organizations (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2011), 13. 
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Carroll’s example is a perfectly obvious case of necessity of clear strategic formulation. 
Unfortunately, all Ukrainian defense guides examined in this research advance only 
slogans, not any real strategies. 
The next issue describes conducting a DR in Ukraine. This research examines 
Ukrainian sources of organization and conducting such reviews, the use of independent 
non-military experts’ evaluations. In addition, there were observed practice of the UK 
and the USA through their DR using the research of Cornish,17 DiRita, Spring and 
Luddy,18 Dorman,19 Larson, Orletsky and Leuschner,20 Punyani,21 and Taylor and 
Boggs.22 On the basis of these observations, a proposal for the necessary change in 
Ukrainian legislation was formulated. 
Another problematic issue is the IAS “Resource.” Unfortunately, there are only a 
few sources about this system. Shelest, who oversaw the creation of this system, has 
argued why this system needed to be created and describes key points of its structure and 
conduction.23 
Finally, the informational base of this research is supported by an examination of 
the legal basis for the implementation of the components of the AFU: the Constitution of 
                                                 
17 Paul Cornish and Andrew M. Dorman, “Fifty Shades of Purple? A Risk-Sharing Approach to the 
2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review,” International Affairs, May 2013. 
18 Larence T. DiRita, Spring Baker, and John Luddy, “Thumbs Down to the Bottom-Up Review,” The 
Heritage Foundation, September, 24, 1993, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1993/09/bg957nbsp-
thumbs-down-to-the-bottom-up-review. 
19 Dorman Andrew, “Crises and Reviews in British Defence Policy,” Britain and Defence 1945–2000; 
a Policy Reevaluation, 2001. 
20 Eric V. Larson, David T Orletsky and Kristin Leuschner. Defense Planning in a Decade of Change: 
Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review. (Santa Monica, CA, 
RAND, 2001) http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1387.pdf. 
21 Punyani Sameer, “The Economics of National Defence in an Age of Austerity,” Chatham House, 
October, 17, 2011, 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Security/171011r
eport.pdf. 
22 Jennifer M. Taylor, Boggs Emily, Strategic Defense Reviews: Procedures, Frameworks, and Tools 
to Enhance Future Defense Institution Building Project (ISBN 978–0-89206-670-4) (Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2011), 
http://csis.org/files/publication/110930_Taylor_StratDefRev_WEB.pdf. 
23 Y. Shelest, “ ‘Resource’ – the Information-Analytical System for Support to the Defense Planning,” 
Science and Defense, no 3 (2005), http://www.nio.mil.gov.ua/pdf/2005-3.pdf. 
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Ukraine, defense and finance laws of Ukraine, decrees of the president of Ukraine, 
resolutions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU), decrees of the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine (CMU), regulations of the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (MFU), 
the MDU, and other ministries and agencies, and materials of research institutions that 
are engaged in the development of the Ukrainian Army. In addition, data and sources 
obtained from seminars, meetings, roundtables and scientific-practical conferences on 
defense planning, as well as operational and current information, which is distributed 
through an electronic communication network of news agencies and Internet resources, 
have been cited. 
Besides legislation, in Ukraine during the last decade, several analyses of defense 
problems have been addressed by Ukrainian defense experts, such as Shelest,24 
Ostapec,25 Aparshin,26 Denegkin,27 and others. However, the first of all these studies 
were aimed at improving the quality of planning by improving the calculation of the 
budgetary requirements. As shown by long experience, the realities of the state budget 
have never provided the needs of the armed forces of Ukraine (Figures 5 and 10). Thus, 
the issue of the defense planning efficiency is still open, but the MDU and the GS need to 
make strong links between defense planning, prioritization and money.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The thesis is structured as a qualitative study. The research provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the activities of the defense planning of the AFU that allows 
the reader to obtain theoretical and practical results that characterize the novelty of the 
research, particularly 
                                                 
24 Y.Shelest, V. Shevchenko, R.Fedorenko, A.Nevolnichenko, I.Bodryk, “The Main Tasks of Rational 
Allocation of Defense Resources into Defense Planning Frame According to the Principles of the Target-
Program Approaching,” Collection of scientific works, Vol 2 (22) (Kyiv, 2004). 
25 M.Pavlenko, O.Ostapec, Y.Kuzmenko, “The Formation of Budget of the Ministry of Defense of 
Ukraine in the Short-Term Defense Planning,” Science and Defense, no 1 (2006). 
26 Aparshin I.M., Denegkin M.M, “Views on the Integration of Defense and Budget Planning of the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine Into a Single System,” Science and Defense, no 1 (2007) 
http://www.nio.mil.gov.ua/pdf/2007-1.pdf. 
27 O. Grinenko, M. Denegkin, “View on Function of Defense Planning System in the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine,” Science and Defense, no 1 (2005). 
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to define the essence of the measures of defense planning and the conduct of the 
DR; 
to substantiate the relationship between defense and budget planning; 
to assess the effectiveness of the IAS “Resource”; 
to specify directions of development and improvement of the procedures of the 
DR and defense planning; 
to introduce further changes of Ukrainian defense planning, in particular with a 
view to its simplification and avoidance of duplication.  
Besides the introduction and conclusion, the work consists of five chapters. 
Chapter II represents the challenge of defense planning in the MDU. Chapter III 
describes the conducting of the DR in Ukraine and an analysis word practice of it. 
Chapter IV provides the analysis of the financial resources of MDU, including planning 
problems of the special fund. Chapter V describes the attempt of the GS to create and 
conduct IAS “Resource” and raises some critical issues about its future existence. 
Chapter VI provides a recommendation for increasing the efficiency of defense planning 
in the MDU and the GS. 
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II. CHALLENGE OF DEFENSE PLANNING IN THE MINISTRY 
OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE 
Ukraine, like any other state, has a specific set of defense tasks, which require 
material resources and ideological and political efforts. According to Article 17 of the 
Constitution of Ukraine28 “[d]efense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine, ensure[s] its economic and informational security are the most important 
functions of the state... Defense of Ukraine, the protection of the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and inviolability rely on the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” 
The goal of defense planning is to produce priorities that will meet the 
requirements of the defense of the state. Unfortunately, this does not work even during 
peacetime. The current situation shows that the Ukrainian defense planning system is 
absolutely useless when it is necessary to make quick decisions in complicated 
conditions. The experience of conducting ATO confirms its weakness. One of the main 
tasks of the MDU is the rational allocation and efficient use of scarce state resources for 
needs of the AFU, especially in today’s Ukraine, that is, producing priorities. Although 
these tasks are clearly defined in the legislation which governs the activities of the MDU 
in defense and budget planning, unfortunately, they were built on old Communist legacy 
concepts and therefore are predictably a failure.  
In 2004 with the adoption of the law of Ukraine About the Organization of 
Defense Planning,29 defense planning actually began. However, the newly established 
defense planning system was not adapted to the existing system of budget planning.  
Defense planning is the part of the strategic planning and management of 
state resources in the defense sphere, carried out in the statutory period to 
ensure the necessary level of defense capability of the logic prospects of 
the AFU, given the nature of real and potential threats to national interests 
and national security in the military sector and economic capabilities of 
                                                 
28 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Law of June 28, 1996, № 254k/96-BP, Constitution of Ukraine, 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80. 
29 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Law of November 18, 2004, № 2198-IV, About the Organization 
of Defense Planning. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2198-15. 
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the state, with specific measures, performers and timing of their 
implementation.30 
According to the law About the Organization of Defense Planning,31 the structure 
of defense planning consist of long- (twelve years), middle- (six years) and short-term 
(two years) planning with the development of appropriate guidelines documents. The end 
result of defense planning in the AFU should be the rational management decisions in the 
form of forecasts, programs, and plans for implementation of the state policy in the field 
of national security and defense. It should consider the maximum extent of the military-
political situation in the region and the world geopolitical situation of Ukraine and its 
economic opportunities, which contribute to implement comprehensive coordinated 
actions for the development of the AFU, providing the necessary level of defense 
capability. 
The major problems in defense policy concerning defense planning are (1) Soviet 
Union strategic framework; (2) unsystematic mosaic nature of work of the public 
authorities in the development and improvement of the legal framework of the military 
security sector—in particular the process of military development; (3) inconsistency of 
legislative and executive branches of government in the context of a comprehensive 
sustainable development of the AFU; (4) structural and functional incompleteness of the 
MDU, the GS, and the AFU. Solving these problems will create preconditions for quality 
improvement of the defense of the state, will promote a positive image of Ukraine to the 
world, and accelerate the process of European integration.  
In addition, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine32 is a completely eastern or Soviet 
approach to defense policy and has failed dismally. This is the main strategic obstacle to 
the shift from the Eastern to Western pattern. The Military Doctrine was built from the 
upper level and does not involve or relate to the bottom levels. Any other documents, 
plans, and programs of long-, middle-, and short-term planning based on the Military 
                                                 
30Ibid., article 1, abstract 6. 
31 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Law of November 18, 2004, № 2198-IV, About the Organization 
of Defense Planning. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2198-15. 
32 President of Ukraine, Decree of June 15, 2004, № 648/2004, About Military Doctrine of Ukraine 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/648/2004. 
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Doctrine are not successful either. Besides, the government is going to change policy, it 
still keep this Soviet strategy in mind and could not get rid of it, not just as a document, 
but as a way of thinking as well. The government is going to change policy; however, it 
still keeps this Soviet strategy in mind and could not get rid of it—not just as a document, 
but as a way of thinking as well. 
This chapter provides a discussion about the development of strategic planning, 
failure of the state defense programs, advance of short-term planning, and the 
establishment of planning structures in the MDU and the GS.  
A. DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC PLANNING 
Reforms in any field involve clarification of the contents of its procedure and the 
determination of its conceptual apparatus. This is especially important if such changes 
occur at the state level and directly affect the national security of the country. The 
uncertainty in this area can lead to serious complications in planning and implementation. 
For instance, the initial phase of the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces in 1996–
2001 shows that the absence of a single definition of the term “transformation” between 
senior military and civilian leadership of the state led to a serious controversy about the 
purpose, timing and implementation of the process. Even at the departmental level 
(Department of Defense), these reforms had no consistency on this issue. This could 
bring transformation to the interagency rhetoric or limited and diminished measures that 
the country cannot afford at that moment. Therefore, as the outcome of the reform on all 
aspects of American forces (conceptual apparatus, the distribution of authority, order and 
timing of events, etc.), Defense Minister D. Rumsfeld approved the Guidelines for 
planning reform of the Ministry of Defense, which structure was included in the 
“Guidelines on defense planning.”33 
The logical question is how to plan and implement a complex event when a single 
conceptual vision of its essence has not been made? Uncertainty of conceptual apparatus 
of the Ukrainian military reform has led to unfavorable consequences. In particular, 
                                                 
33 A. Medin, “To the Question About Transformation of Armed Forces of the USA,” Foreign Military 
Review, no 7 (2005): 2. 
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during the 1990s, Ukrainian political and public figures apprehended this process in 
different ways, sometimes with opposing positions. For example, some considered the 
main task as “reduction of personnel and armaments,”34 others considered it to be 
“structural changes and modernization,”35 and some even identified it as a “serious threat 
to the military security of Ukraine.”36 Such conflicts led to a critical perception of 
military conversion processes among the people of Ukraine. However, the conceptual 
framework of military-reformation areas still are not defined in the legislation. According 
to Belov,37 “Ukrainian example of specific features of post-Soviet Union states ... One of 
the consequences became … lack of consistency, some declarative and amorphousness of 
Ukrainian legislation on national security and defense.” 
The Military Doctrine of Ukraine38 is the main document of strategy level. This 
document contains just general political guidelines (non-block country), but does not 
clarify clear tasks for the AFU, just general statements. Thus, Military Doctrine, as a 
strategic document of Soviet legacy, is actually a list of slogans which failed at the 
beginning of its existence. Unfortunately, the authorities (and not just the military) are 
still thinking that the Military Doctrine contains all the answers for every defense 
questions, which it does not.. 
More confusion arises from the fact that the Military Doctrine is not useful and 
effective for defense policy, and other legal documents of strategic level based on the 
Military Doctrine were and are going to fail. The National Security Strategy of Ukraine39 
developed and approved it on the basis of national security policy framework. This 
                                                 
34 G.K Kruchkov, “The Issues of Legislative Support of Formation and Implementation of Defense 
Policy of Ukraine,” Defense Policy of Ukraine: Realities and Prospects, National Institute of International 
Security Problems. (Kyiv, 2004), 30. 
35 Ibid., 30. 
36 Ibid., 30. 
37 O. Belov, “Defense Review and Legislative Support of Reformation of Armed Forces of Ukraine,” 
Defense Policy of Ukraine: Realities and Prospects, National Institute of International Security Problems. 
(Kyiv, 2004), 57.  
38 President of Ukraine, Decree of June 15, 2004, № 648/2004, About Military Doctrine of Ukraine 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/648/2004. 
39 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Decree of January 16, 1997, № 3/97-BP, About the Concept of 
National Security of Ukraine, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3/97-%D0%B2%D1%80. 
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Strategy is the basis for the development of concepts, strategies, and development 
programs of the state military organization (SMO) and its components.40 In 2005, neither 
the National Security Strategy of Ukraine nor other documents defined the strategic 
directions of military security and military building (including the process of reforming 
the AFU). Although, one Military Doctrine of Ukraine41 is of the sections of the modern 
its military-strategic component, it could not claim to be an entire integrated document of 
strategy according to its parameters. However, one Military Doctrine of Ukraine42 is part 
of the modern military-strategic component; it could not claim to be an entire integrated 
document of strategy according to its parameters. This is actually an example of 
conceptual dissonance that destroys defense planning. 
Even now, after one year of ATO in the Southeast part of Ukraine, the new 
government assigned a task43 to develop a new set of long-term planning documents. This 
task, identified by the NSDCU in due time (three months), almost failed again. 
Conducting a detailed review of the provisions of key defense planning documents 
subject to the changes of military-political situation had failed. Nothing changed on the 
defense planning legislation. At present, most of the leaders of Ukraine are not able to 
carry out program tasks, because on one hand is the tasks are not timely, and on the other 
there is no money to do them. 
In Ukraine, a complex system of state administration and interagency 
coordination governs security issues (coordinating the structure of the administration of 
the president, Apparatus of the NSDCU and the Secretariat of the CMU with 
duplication). This promotes not joint efforts, but fragmentation and disorientation of the 
executive system, which leads to low quality planning and management and slows down 
                                                 
40 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Law of November 18, 2004, № 2198-IV, About the Organization 
of Defense Planning. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2198-15. 
41 President of Ukraine, Decree of June 15, 2004, № 648/2004, About Military Doctrine of Ukraine 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/648/2004. 
42 President of Ukraine, Decree of June 15, 2004, № 648/2004, About Military Doctrine of Ukraine 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/648/2004. 
43 President of Ukraine, Decree of May 13, 2014, № 468/2014, About Decision of the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on April 28, 2014 “About Measures to Improve the Efficiency of 
Planning in the Sector of Security and Defense.” http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/468/2014. 
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the response to the situation. The MFU has undue influence on the final formation of the 
state programs and plans. Activity of the MFU directs on compliance with the established 
structure of budget expenditures that do not depend on actual needs, even if these needs 
have substantial reports. 
The president of Ukraine has key functions of management in the sphere of 
national security and defense.44 However, attempts to reconcile the provisions of the 
Constitution, and the need for political expediency and effective management of the 
defense area to distribute the zone of influence of the president and the Prime Minister up 
to that time have not had the desired results. Competition for these zones of influence 
continues the process of reducing the role and effectiveness of the NSDCU in 
coordinating and monitoring the activities of bodies of executive power on issues of 
national security and defense. The apparatus of the NSDCU has a lot of tasks for the 
preparation of a huge volume of documents; however, little attention is paid to the 
analysis and forecasts of escalating threats. Absence of distribution of authority and 
crossing it both vertically (subordinated security structures) and horizontally (interaction 
between departments of the NSDCU, the President’s Secretariat, the Secretariat of the 
CMU, and between relevant ministries and agencies) significantly complicates the 
functioning of the security sector. 
The current Strategic Defense Bulletin (SDB) “is [a] chronological documentation 
on the reform and development of the AFU and OMF of Ukraine.”45 It defines long-term 
objectives, the ultimate goal of development and prospective frame of the SMO, the main 
tasks of strategic, operational and tactical levels, and general operational capabilities of 
the forces. The SDB developed on the basis of the DR.46 Critically, it does not address 
how to achieve these objectives in light of the current security and financial situation 
facing Ukraine. Besides SDB tasks of strategic, operational and tactical levels, this 
document does not provide a clear understanding for the Commander of the services of 
                                                 
44 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Law of June 28, 1996, № 254k/96-BP, Constitution of Ukraine, article 
106, subparagraph 17. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80. 
45 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Law of November 18, 2004, № 2198-IV, article 9, About the 
Organization of Defense Planning. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2198-15. 
46 Ibid., art. 9. 
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the AFU of what capabilities they should have or obtain and how military units should be 
trained. As was mentioned in the Military Doctrine, the SDB has obvious slogans as well, 
but they are based on the first DR, the failure of which is discussed in the next chapter. 
Adjustment of the SDB with new authority could be on the basis of a special DR for 
definitions of new and refinement of pre-defined separate areas of development of the 
AFU and other military formation47 (OMF), taking into account changes in the military-
strategic situation and the actual funding of the defense. Additionally, the SDB should 
contain more specific information and tasks about projects, plans, and the responsible 
person (namely the position or institution and not virtual). The definition of responsibility 
is very important and makes someone personally responsible for the implementation or 
failure of certain projects. Therefore, the SDB should have an additional responsibility 
for the implementation of measures (not for the using of funds) and time of its 
implementation. 
There is a sample of a recent strategic document that was created on the 
government level. In September 2014, the president of Ukraine introduced the program 
“Reform Strategy—2020.”48 This program clearly and simply indicates the main ways of 
development and the achievement of key indicators for the state. This is the main five-
year document to be implemented, and the president, his administration, and the CMU 
are responsible for that. However, this is a failure because it does not rely on the current 
situation, and demonstrates the desire but not the ability to achieve it. Besides, this 
program concerns defense issues as well: the MDU and the GS were not at all involved. 
Even the NSDCU was scarcely consulted. This example shows an absence of strategy 
building from the bottom up. 
                                                 
47 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Law of December 6, 1991, no. 1932-XII, About the Defense of 
Ukraine. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1932-12/page1, art. 12.: Other military formations include 
the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
of Ukraine, Forces of Civilian Defense of Ukraine. 
48 “Petro Poroshenko presented ‘Strategy of reforms 2020’: The purpose of reforms is membership in 
the EU,” on September 25, 2014, Press Service of President. 
http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/31289.html. 
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B. MIDDLE-TERM DEFENSE PLANNING 
The program’s documents of middle-term planning was and is created based upon 
to the Military Doctrine as well. The current set of middle-term defense planning 
programs is difficult to understand and assess because the information and indicators are 
non-transparent and non-interconnected. Based on the last DR, the first middle-term 
program—State Program of Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006–
201149—has never been clarified. The successive program—The State Complex Program 
of Reformation and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Until 201750—was 
approved just in 2013, but in May 2014 this program had been suspended.51 The last one 
is restricted information, but even unrestricted information is not transparent and 
repetitive with other target defense program (the creation aircraft AN-70,52 building the 
warship,53 and creation of the rocket system54) or non-interconnection (development of 
armament and military equipment [AME]55). Moreover, middle-term programs are 
approved by the president or the CMU. This makes the program almost impossible to 
amend, mostly because of complex procedures and the necessity to make an agreement 
with different states’ agencies. The result of fulfilment of middle-term programs are 
usually dissatisfying. Thus, such plans need to be revised and adjusted or completely 
canceled to avoid too many planning documents which in turn need to be adjusted with 
each other, as separate programs. These programs should not rely on the government for 
                                                 
49 President of Ukraine, Decree of December 27, 2005, № 1862–25/2005 (restricted access) About 
Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on December 9, 2005 “About the State 
Program of Development the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006–2011.” 
50 President of Ukraine, Decree of September 2, 2013, № 479/2013, About Decision of the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on September 2, 2013 “About The State Complex Program of 
Reformation and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Until 2017.” 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/479/2013. 
51 President Of Ukraine, Decree of May 13, 2014, № 468/2014, About Decision of the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on April 28, 2014 “About Measures to Improve the Efficiency of 
Planning in the Sector of Security and Defense.” http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/468/2014. 
52 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Law of February 5, 2004, № 1462-IV, About the National Program 
for the Creation of Military-Transport Aircraft An-70 and its Purchases Under the State Defense Order. 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1462-15. 
53 Restricted access. 
54 Restricted access. 
55 Restricted access. 
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their approval. Just the MDU and the GS should define managers or persons responsible 
for allocating financial resources for defense programs, reporting on their performance, 
making decisions on the development of the defense industrial complex (DIC), 
transferring of military camps, and relocating or rearranging of structures.  
However, it may be reasonable to consider that instead of middle-term plans and 
programs, the Strategy of development of the AFU should be developed as a road map of 
the operational capabilities of the forces. It has to be prepared for the planned year and 
the next four years (some parameters can be determined for the following years) as a 
guidance for short-term planning. The strategy is expected to be developed on the basis 
of approval by government-forecasted financial performance. It will define the tasks of 
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and capacity and capabilities of the AFU. 
Thus, it will replace the state programs and other middle-term planning documents, 
which are actually some kind of strategy. But unlike the State Program, it has to be fully 
detailed in the appendices by every manager—in which direction they have to take their 
planning. and it should be as transparent as possible for the public. In addition, it is 
significant to involve the services of the AFU to develop the strategy of development the 
AFU, define capabilities of military units, and bond available resources with priorities. 
C. ADVANCE OF SHORT-TERM PLANNING 
The transition to the principles of the program-target method of the planning of 
armed forces development was established during the implementation of the defense 
planning system in the MDU and the GS. The main advantages of this method are that 
organizational and resource support for the implementation of targeted programs should 
fully meet the requirements of a market economy and determine not only the needs of the 
state, but also its economic opportunities. The program-target method of planning is some 
kind of eastern version of Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System.56 
The program-target method has been provided since 2002 in the state budget planning, 
                                                 
56 Hitch Carlies H. Decision-Making for Defense. (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1967). 
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but due to the Soviet Union basis system, it is not as efficient in Ukraine as it is in the 
MDU level, as the state as a whole.  
On January 1, 2005, the first cycle of short-term defense planning was launched. 
The Plan of Maintenance and Development of Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006–200757 
was developed the first time. Subsequently, each cycle of the Plan of Maintenance and 
Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (PMD) has improved based on the 
experience gained from the formation of the budget request of the MDU with regard to 
mechanisms of short-term defense planning. The main problems that appeared during that 
work are as follows: 
(1) Annual expected indicators of defense expenditures, defined by the CMU58 for 
2006–2011, are significantly lower than those provided for the SBD59 and the 
State Program of Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006–
201160 (Appendix A). Thus, the MDU could not provide efficient planning 
because neither the AFU strategic needs nor middle-term (approved by law) 
are satisfied. In this case it is impossible to do planning with the full 
knowledge that real needs never meet the necessary expenditure. 
(2) There is no mechanism for separation indicators of expenditure for needs of 
the AFU into total defense expenditure. The defense budget of 3% of gross 
domestic products (GDP) was approved in the asset 2 of the law About the 
Defense of Ukraine.61 However, the defense budget does not completely 
belong to the AFU, but the OMF as well. Only about 2.75% does. Exactly 2% 
of GDP was dedicated to needs of the MDU in the Decree of the president of 
                                                 
57 Annual Plan of Maintenance and Development of Armed Forces of Ukraine is created according to 
the Order of Minister of Defense of Ukraine on January 19, 2010, 15. On Approval of the Regulations on 
the Organization and Implementation of Middle-Term and Short-Term Defense Planning in the Ministry of 
Defense of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 
58 Source: Decrees can be found at http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws. 
59 President of Ukraine, Decree of June 22, 2004, № 670/2004, About Decision of the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on June 17, 2004 “About Strategic Defense Bulletin Until 2015” 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/670/2004. 
60 Annual Plan of Maintenance and Development of Armed Forces of Ukraine is created according to 
the Order of Minister of Defense of Ukraine on January 19, 2010, 15. On Approval of the Regulations on 
the Organization and Implementation of Middle-Term and Short-Term Defense Planning in the Ministry of 
Defense of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 
61 Verchovna Rada of Ukraine. Law of December 6, 1991, no. 1932-XII, About the Defense of 
Ukraine. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1932-12/page1. 
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Ukraine,62 which adopted “The State Program of Development of Armed 
Forces of Ukraine 2006–2011.” Besides, as Figures 5 and 10 show, since 1993 
it has never happened. 
(3) Boundary defense expenditures for the MDU for the planned year defined at 
the beginning of the budget process of the MFU do not exceed the level of 
previous years, do not take into account rising prices and inflation, and do not 
meet even the minimum requirements of the AFU. 
(4) Uncertainty of limit expenditures for the needs of the AFU for the planned 
year means the GS must redo the project of PMD several times (first, 
according to the needs proposed by commanders of species of the AFU and 
command of forces that are not part of species, then with subject to the 
limitations and proposals of resource managers of budget programs 
(subprograms)63). 
(5) Late defined at the state level macroeconomic indicators in the middle-term 
planning makes the initial stages of planning—determination of total financial 
resources—harder.  
(6) The most significant problem is that the Services Commanders have never 
been involved directly in either the defense or budget planning processes. The 
Services just allocate what they have from above and proceed according to the 
direction from the GS. The full centralization from the Soviet Union period 
still exists and initiative is usually punished. 
At the present time, all previously listed items exist, except item (4). In 2010, the 
new Order of Minister of Defense64 made changes in procedure of short-term defense 
planning. Thus, in 2010 the annual Tentative Plan of Maintenance and Development of 
the Armed Forces of Ukraine (TPMD) was launched. It includes expenditures to the 
needs of the AFU for the planned year according to documents of middle-term planning. 
The PMD is created for three years—a refined date for the planned year and boundary 
measures and defense expenditures for the next two years. However, in 2010, a new 
problem concerning item (5) arose. Thus, in 2006–2010 the State Program of 
Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006–2011 defined financial indicators 
for the AFU. However, during 2011–2013 the PMD was created almost blindly, with 
                                                 
62 President of Ukraine. Decree of December 27, 2005, no. 1862–25/2005. About Decision of the 
National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine from 9th of December 2005 “About the State Program 
of Development of Armed Forces of Ukraine 2006 – 2011.” 
63 Resource managers are defined by the Orders of Minister of Defense of Ukraine and the Head of the 
General Staff of Armed Forces of Ukraine. 
64 Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Order on January 19, 2010, 15. On Approval of the Regulations on 
the Organization and Implementation of Middle-Term and Short-Term Defense Planning in the Ministry of 
Defense of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 
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only a grand total of defense expenditures that were defined by the CMU and did not 
address real needs. The MDU had never had support from the government until the recent 
events in 2014–2015. The financial problem of defense planning is not that plans could 
not meet the appropriation, but that the MFU had never carried out the laws that were 
approved by the government. 
Today, the short-term planning process in the AFU performs cyclically. The cycle 
covers two years, but started a year before the adoption of the State Budget of Ukraine, 
according to which will be implemented taken (refined) decisions about long- and 
middle-term programs and the PMD. The short-term planning process ties to the budget 
process in Ukraine. The relatively short-term planning cycle can be divided into four 
stages65: 
1st stage (November–March): determination of preliminary indicators of the State 
Budget of Ukraine for the MDU project for the next year, the forecast expenditure for the 
following years, and changes to the list of budget programs. 
2nd stage (April–July): development of the TPMD, formation and submission of 
the budget request of the MDU to the the MFU. 
3rd stage (August–November): support of the Law of Ukraine “About the State 
Budget of Ukraine” project for the next year and designing of the PMD project for the 
next year. 
4th stage (December–February): approval of the consolidated trial budget of the 
MDU and the PMD for the budget year. 
Thereby, today implementation of the PMD enables the GS to plan measures of 
development and reformation, detailing prospective directions of middle-term defense 
programs. The previous programs of building, reformation, and development of the AFU 
were mostly internal in nature. The state programs aimed at solving current problems of 
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the MDU and the AFU, but they were not consistent on the objectives, tasks, and 
deadlines, and were not provided with appropriate resources. 
The overall level of defense spending, in theory, should correspond to the 
economic and financial policy of the state and the international situation. However, this 
level does not take into account the condition and capability of the troops and the 
necessary substantiation requirements for the AFU. The allocated amount of the budget is 
distributed between the structural units of the MDU and the GS and services of the AFU. 
This method of development budget is ineffective, because it created a gap between the 
planning of development of the AFU (defense planning) and budgeting. Both of these 
critical functions are performed by two different bodies of military and public 
administration: defense planning is by the GS, and development budget is by the MFU 
according to the request of the MDU. 
Until recently, planning for one to two years in the MDU and the GS was limited 
to drawing a large number of diverse plans: conducting organizational activities, 
operational, combat, commander, mobilization training, economic activities, use of 
equipment, logistics, technical, and other types of collateral. The basis for the 
compilation of these plans were decisions of the respective commanders of services of 
the AFU, heads of structural units of the MDU, and the GS. Each of these plans had a 
separate calculation for the needs of their resources, but they all were not consistent 
among themselves. Such non-concordance led to cost overruns and in some cases even to 
the accumulation of residues of resources at the end of the year. These residues were 
finally lost for the MDU, because they transferred to state-deferred revenue and did not 
return back. The allocation of resources to ensure the implementation of plans usually 
was subjective and proportional. Plans were drawn up before the beginning of each 
training year and could not be taken into account during the development of the defense 
budget, because of time differences. Thus, these plans were not financially provided, 
except for the protected budget programs (as salaries for personnel). 
In addition, because of the inconsistency of the dates of commencement and 
completion of development of the previously-mentioned plans and key financial planning 
documents of the MDU, it was impossible to achieve optimality cost during the execution 
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of certain tasks because of the lack of cost basis. These issues were partially solved due 
to implementation of defense planning. All these aspects confirm the need for further 
improvement of the system of defense planning, which would be united by a common 
intention as to its organization and implementation, and coordination with budget 
planning. 
D. INSTITUTION ESTABLISHMENT OF MDU AND GS 
Effective support of military and economic security requires making optimal 
decisions on the development of forces, conducting continuous monitoring of the 
compliance of their current activities with the strategic goals, and adapting armed forces 
to the external environment through the formation and implementation of effective 
development programs. Current events in 2014 have demonstrated that the military 
organization of Ukraine has been unable to respond effectively to current challenges. The 
defense was not properly organized. The AFU, Security Service of Ukraine, Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, and Intelligence Service have been unable to be proactive. As a result, 
Ukraine has lost part of its territory. However, each event has its reasons and 
consequences. The loss of defense is not an instantaneous phenomenon. This 
phenomenon has led to human disorder, blind and continuous personnel downsizing, 
reform of the structural units in the MDU and the GS, and thoughtless reduction into 
military units. 
This section provides a discussion about the development of structure of the MDU 
and the GS, and failures associated with the reformation of the bodies of military 
authorities and their activities. 
1. Development of Structures of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and 
the General Staff of Armed Forces of Ukraine 
Since 1991, Ukraine has received considerable military resources. In particular, 
within the territory of the state,66 resources include three arms and two tank armies, army 
corps, four air armies, separate army air defense, missile army, and part of the black sea 
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fleet. In general, Ukraine has had different military formations of up to 900,000 soldiers, 
about 6,500 tanks, 7,000 armored vehicles, 1,500 planes, 350 ships, 1,272 nuclear 
warheads (intercontinental missile base), and 2,500 units of tactical nuclear weapons. 
Thus, such a military heritage allowed for the creation of a powerful national army, 
which was able to ensure the safety and integrity of the territory. The sale of surplus 
property and AME could obtain sufficient funds for the modernization of the AFU. 
However, twenty-three years after Ukraine’s independence, the AFU was not 
close to combat readiness nor able to fulfill its main function: to protect the territory 
against external aggressors. Why did this happen? First, the army and state security have 
never been priorities of the president or the VRU. Thus, the AFU was always a low 
priority to the state. The army, as a state institution, has never been interested in the 
political-military leadership of Ukraine since independence. The lack of attention was 
due to a favorable geopolitical situation that has led to neglect in all military formations 
of the state. In addition, the suspension of political-military leadership from the problems 
of the AFU reduce Ukraine’s ability to protect itself. 
Next, the most problematic consequence of such a political-military leadership of 
the state was the uncertainty of accession to the system of collective security (continuous 
changes of views from 2002 to 2010) that led to the attainment of non-aligned risky 
status. Thus, there was a gradual, deliberate, and conscious simplification of the whole 
security sector, which led to catastrophic personnel issues. Political appointments drained 
professionalism from the force starting with leadership at the highest level. Appendix B 
shows the timeline of the Ministers of Defense of Ukraine during the independence of 
Ukraine. When in 2010 Viktor Yanukovych67 became a president of Ukraine, people who 
occupied key positions (with his consent) held frankly pro-Russian views, some actions 
of which were aimed at destroying the defense potential of Ukraine. Only for the last four 
years (2010–2014), eight Ministers of Defense have been replaced (five—just in 2014). 
That cannot be considered normal. Moreover, very seldom did a Minister of Defense 
have appropriate professional qualification as a manager and an understanding of defense 
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reform. Thus, there was a lack of responsibility in defense building, and no political 
understanding or willingness to make changes. This unfortunate trend has led to a lack of 
strategic planning and compliance with any plans. Since the Ministers of Defense have 
been unqualified (since the end of 2007), it led to the failure of a number of state 
programs related to the development of the AFU. 
Next, defense authorities in Ukraine have never been appropriately punished for 
their responsibility in the failure of these or other plans. This resulted in the absence of 
appropriate leadership of the military sphere. Moreover, every newly appointed Minister 
of Defense or Chief of the GS develops new reforms and developments of the AFU that 
usually contradict previous programs. 
In addition, the authority of the MDU and the GS carried out organizational and 
practical measures to change the structure and the number of troops and military bodies, 
which led to a substantial decrease in the intensity of combat training, reducing the 
serviceability of the AME. The reformation of the AFU has continued since its formation 
in 1991, primarily aimed at reducing the number of troops, and changing the structure of 
management groups and other military units. The military-political leadership of Ukraine 
is constantly saved by the army, consciously implementing the strategy to shift funding 
for the fourth quarter of the year. That means that a significant part of financial resources 
was returned to the state budget, because of the impossibility of its being u due to the 
long timetable for procurement procedures. Thus, even at a low overall level of financing 
defense needs, real financial plans have almost never been enforced.  
Finally, corruption permeated all levels of the defense and security sector and 
especially affected the AFU. Despite informing the public (through the mass media), 
almost none of the official security sector, including the AFU, have been held responsible 
for their actions or inaction. Mostly this issue is due to legislation gaps and undefined 
responsibility. 
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The structure of the MDU changed almost every year, especially from the 
beginning of defense planning. According to the first White Book 2005,68 MDU did not 
have a very broad structure, but had five positions of Deputy Minister of Defense (one—
First Deputy). However, the number of departments and units which reported directly to 
the Minister of Defense rose gradually.69 In 2010, beginning with the presidency of 
Viktor Yanukovych,70 the MDU had seven positions of the Deputy Minister of Defense 
(one—First Deputy).71 However, the next year it was just three positions. Thus, a 
rhetorical question arises: Why was it necessary to create seven positions for just one 
year?  
In the last decade, the structure of the GS changed substantially and became 
closer to NATO standards (compared with its structure in 2005,72 2009,73 and 2013.74 
Although the MDDMP (J-5) almost meets the needs of the AFU in compliance with 
quantitative indicators, the majority of its tasks are not related to defense planning, but to 
organizational measures, accounting for the deployment of troops, mobilization, and so 
forth. The previously-mentioned decisions over reorganization only led to the formal 
reassignment of personnel to new positions without gaining the ability of the newly 
created controls or managements to perform tasks on assignment. 
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2. Failures Associated with the Reformation of the Bodies of Military 
Authorities and their Activities 
In 2003, for the first time in its independence, Ukraine clashed with armed 
aggressors. Troops unprepared to go to war, weak training of commanders and soldiers, 
the outdatedness of existing equipment, and lack of proper equipment and weapons 
unnecessarily spilled the blood of many Ukrainians. On the one hand, the new type of 
war against Ukraine and the ATO revealed a number of problems not only at the AFU, 
but at almost all security sector agencies—the Security Service, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, State Border Service, Intelligence and counter-Intelligence agencies. On the 
other, the war began due to the extraordinary and an unprecedented weakening of the 
AFU. 
There are many convincing pieces of evidence that the Russian Federation did not 
start the war against Ukraine because of the conditions of preservation and development 
of defense capabilities. Of course, in this context, it could be noted that the 
shortsightedness of the presidents, as well as the indifference and inaction of all 
governments, without exception, led to the loss of defense capability and put the 
existence of the Ukrainian state as a whole on the line. Of particular concern is the lack of 
responsibility of civilian and military leaders of the military authorities for the 
preparation and implementation of defense planning documents. This was facilitated by 
the fact that none of the governments has held a deep revulsion of the results of the 
activity of the MDU on the implementation of state programs for reforming the AFU. 
Moreover, very often the heads of state and government and ministers of defense resorted 
to populist statements. These statements harmed the morale and fighting spirit of the 
army, undermined the authorities’ credibility, and worst of all, served as a cover for 
corruption. Unfortunately, an irresponsible attitude to the development of defense 
capabilities has permeated all levels of power, from presidents and prime ministers to 
commanders of military units or heads of directorates of the AFU. However, the question 
of personal responsibility for carrying out unexpected events and wasting public funds on 
responsible persons was never addressed.  
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The military-political authorities of the state watched the corruption in the AFU, 
and sometimes (during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych75) directly encouraged 
military leaders to engage in corrupt practices. The AFU has dominated the Soviet 
defensive mentality, which is the product of a bygone era and has always been hindered 
from moving forward by the Ukrainian army. Ukrainian academic military school, which 
was created on Soviet principles, still has significant impact on personnel. That is why 
human lawlessness still exists that took place in the AFU from the very beginning of 
military personnel education. 
Unresolved problems remain in the AFU regarding the manager of the forces: (1) 
a significant number of supervisors were created; (2) excessive centralization decreased 
the initiative and independence of subordinates; (3) excessive paperwork emerged, where 
the bureaucracy created unnecessary paperwork for its own sake. 
Actually, in previous years Ukraine had gained considerable experience in 
defense planning, but Ukraine’s results, embodied in the relevant programs, remained far 
from ideal. Such programs often present overly ambitious goals and measures not based 
on a real assessment of the economic, technological, and production capabilities of the 
state. Moreover, the time required for their implementation was not taken into account. 
Thus, these necessities required these activities to be postponed and often canceled. 
At the end of December 2014, military-economic training “Concentration—2014” 
took place, and the president of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, noted76 that the military-
political and military-strategic situation around Ukraine remained tense; events at 
Donbass required adequate response and measures aimed at solving problems in the 
protection and restoration of the sovereignty, territorial integrity of Ukraine. Poroshenko 
stated the following: “Everyone in terms of the starting of active attacks against our 
country should know their place, functions, and tasks, not to show confusion, but to have 
a clear plan of action. This applies to the leadership of public authorities and heads of 
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regional state administrations.”77 Poroshenko emphasized78 that Ukraine has not paid 
enough attention to the defense sector, which has led to a lower level of defense. 
According to him, this was the reason for the violation of the territorial integrity of the 
state. After all, if Ukraine had had an adequate level of training for the AFU, and the 
ability to recover, of course the situation would have developed differently. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the development of strategic planning, the failure of the 
state defense programs, the advance of short-term planning, and the establishment of 
planning structures in the MDU and the GS. The improvement of the system of defense 
planning requires taking the previous implementation experience in the AFU into 
account: materials consultation with the military experts of the leading Western countries, 
as well as practical experience gained during the training of officers of the GS in the 
departments of defense planning of the armed forces of foreign countries. 
At present, it is necessary to ensure the full integration of long-term, middle-term, 
and short-term planning, taking into account the available funding. In the existing system 
of defense planning, strategic documents based on the failed Military Doctrine limit 
further development. Long-term military planning has actually dropped out of the total 
planning process in the development of the AFU. The system still values the Military 
Doctrine, not for the concept, but to use as a slogan to follow during Soviet times. Thus, 
the MDU and the GS should inform the government about the counterproductivity of the 
Military Doctrine, so it can be canceled.  
Middle- and short-term components of defense planning also need substantial 
revision and improvement. They actually exist today in parallel: separated, and even 
independent from each other. Currently, the only document of military planning which to 
some extent is created independent of any obstacle in the yearly planning cycle is an 
annual PMD (for the executive year). However, due to the gap between MDU budget 
estimates for the AFU and the approved budget, the plans experienced hasty changes 




which devastated their effectiveness. As a result, the PMD is constantly changing; 
planned measures are transferred, postponed, or cancelled; and funds are redistributed 
manually without any analysis of possible consequences for the future. This completely 
destroys the system of defense planning. However, this is the only document closely 
related to budget planning and budgeting at the ministerial and state level. 
Finally, the thoughtless personnel reductions of the MDU and the GS made the 
AFU unable to fulfill its tasks. Weak military-political leadership and massive corruption 
hampers defense development.  
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III. CONDUCTING DEFENSE REVIEWS: HOW IT SHOULD 
WORK AND WHY THEY DO NOT ACTUALLY WORK 
The DR is a complex process and has a lot of challenges, especially if the country 
is from a post-Soviet Union region. The DR is not a document, but a process. The 
practice of conducting reviews shows that the majority of DRs are not successful. 
In August 2011 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a conference 
was provided “to consider how to best guide partner states through the strategic defense 
review (SDR) process.”79 The main point was to develop some “approaches, procedures, 
frameworks, and tools to enhance future defense institution building projects… [and help 
to] structure and execute strategic defense reviews … tailored to meet their [international 
nations] individual needs.”80 
Above all, what is the DR? First, it is a process. The DR is a very hard and 
complex process that provides a formal examination of defense objectives and 
challenges, capacity and capability, effectiveness and efficiency, and—significantly—
makes an effective future defense policy within resources and force structure constraints. 
Although the results of this process could be formulated in a document, it does not mean 
that the DR is successful. Thus, if the DR fails, the document is worthless. “A successful 
SDR identifies an important defense mission that derive from key overarching defense 
requirements… the military capabilities essential to performing those missions 
effectively and the resource mechanisms necessary to provide those capabilities.”81  
This chapter provides some causes for the failure of the DR. First, the 
unwillingness of the government (or military authorities) to define a clear defense policy 
and make changes is responsible for such failure. After the Cold War, a majority of 
countries made policies (including defense) under conditions of uncertainty and with 
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financial constraints. Second, with or without a new strategy, the government makes an 
attempt to build new forces on the old foundation without links between them. The 
success of force transformation depends on how the foundation was laid, and, of course, 
how it was supported by available resources. Third, the absence of experienced experts 
and planning tools played a typical role in Post-Soviet countries. In this case, the 
assistance of international advisors is very helpful, but can yield results if authorities only 
desire to fulfill the task. Fourth, using post-Soviet (so-called Eastern) assumptions and 
concepts made it nearly impossible to build new efficiency on the old bases. Delivering 
the Western strategy, decision-making process, and defense planning using the Eastern 
model as a base and tool does not work. Fifth, the centralization of authority saps 
initiative and critical thinking; in this case, the DR has never been successful. Sixth, 
without a balance among force structure, capability, and resources, especially in finance, 
it is impossible to prevail and provide necessary strategy. Finally, the lack of 
responsibility, collaboration, and transparency held the DR back from success. 
This chapter discusses the failure of the DR based on British and American 
practices, and mistakes in analysis in the DR in Ukraine. 
A. EVOLUTION OF BRITISH DEFENSE REVIEW 
The UK practice of the DR has almost always been conducted under fiscal 
pressure. Thus, “the ‘Treasury-led defense review’ has long been code for a range of 
policy errors and misjudgments: a failure to comprehend the vulnerability of the UK and 
its interests in this or that security challenge; a willingness to prioritize domestic (and 
vote-winning) spending over national security; and general ignorance of strategic and 
military matters.”82 The evolution of the British DR is better discussed by dividing it into 
two periods: the Cold War, and afterward. The purpose is to address the different defense 
policies: capability-based and threat-based, respectively. However, the introduction in 
2010 of a new idea about a shift to a risk-based strategy could provide a third period. 
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The first period covers the timeframe from 1948 till 1990. This period of UK 
history was beset by financial crisis, a growing military relationship (even dependence) 
with the USA, the Cold War, the creation and sustenance of a nuclear deterrent, and a 
desire to have influence on the world stage. During this time, six reviews took place. 
After World War II, the first significant strategic document was the Three Pillars 
Strategy in 1948 that was based on three main assumptions for national security: 
“protecting the United Kingdom; maintaining vital sea communications; and securing the 
Middle East as a defensive and striking base against the Soviet Union.”83 However, the 
oversight was that changes cannot occur immediately; they need resources and time. 
Thus, in spite of economic decline, the issue of the Korean War induced the UK to 
approve the 1950 Defense Policy and Global Strategy Paper (DPGSP) which actually 
implemented the Three Pillars Strategy and based it on a three-phase strategy: (1) nuclear 
deterrence policy, (2) establishing NATO’s conventional forces, and (3) sustain 
conventional and atomic weapons from the air. These phases were stipulated by the 
cooperation with NATO and EU against the Soviet Union. With this in mind, the British 
government decided to fast-track military programs and significantly increase the budget. 
Thus, as an elaboration of the last document in 1952, the next DPGSP was approved. The 
significance of that document was a policy shift at two levels: “the balance between Hot 
and Cold War”84 and “changes the balance of conventional forces, with land and air 
forces being given priority.”85 However, though all these documents provided a first 
attempt at the British DR, the shortcomings were not due to the first effort but to a poorly 
thought-out strategy of defense development—lacking a link between existing forces and 
structure and planning. The reason could be the weak position of the Ministry of Defense 
against three Service Chiefs at that time.  
The second review was represented by the 1957 Defense White Paper. Due to the 
Suez Crisis in 1956 and the following financial crisis, this White Paper used the Three 
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Pillars Strategy as an assumption of the full implementation of the 1950 DPGSP, but 
omitted the second stage and focused on British nuclear forces. The review provided 
significant force reduction for cost-saving purposes. The weight of conducting the 1957 
Defense White Paper was running it “through the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and sought 
to override the Service departments. This was a significant step for the MoD’s 
development and represented quite a considerable coup for the department against the 
previously all-powerful Service departments.”86 
During 1958–1969, the so-called Nuclear Review was conducted. It was not 
official, but a significant shift happened in the UK by 1969 “had become entirely 
dependent upon the United States for the provision of its strategic nuclear platform, 
although the government emphasized that it retained operational independence.”87 
However, in 1964, due to the Labor government, the defense policy was changed to 
emphasize conventional rather than nuclear forces. Series of the so-called Healey 
Reviews88 were focused on procurement, but due to insufficient results, the military 
dimension of policy was changed through the programs. These changes and the financial 
crisis in the UK forced significant removal of forces deployed outside Europe. The result 
led the UK to “the beginning of the withdrawal [forces] from East of Suez and the 
downplaying of the world role.”89 
The next review—the Mason Review—was the implementation of the previous 
ones. In 1974, the conservative government made the decision “to concentrate the British 
defence effort on NATO and the independent nuclear deterrent.”90 Moreover, due to the 
necessity of saving costs, the Mason Review “marked the end of Britain’s world role with 
the virtual elimination of Britain’s out-of-area capability and the withdrawal of many of 
the residual forces deployed beyond Europe.’91 
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Finally, in 1981, the so-called Nott Review “was never formally a review but 
instead a realignment of forces to meet the financial situation of the time.”92 Moreover, 
“the changes under Nott marked the fruition of trends begun by Healey and continued by 
Mason.”93 Two continental and maritime commitments to NATO were defined as saving 
costs. This policy was not a critical breakpoint, but that time the MoD “was to achieve a 
fully integrated defence policy.”94  
The second period started in 1991 with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
which brought new uncertainty to defense policy and not just to Britain. The 1991 White 
Paper provided the Options for Change. Distinguishing this review was the strategic 
vacuum during its operation, and because of that, the government did not claim an 
official defense policy. However, Options for Change “began the shift towards a 
capability-based rather than threat-based defence policy”95 and, despite the keeping all 
three Services uncharged, they were to be reduced again. Moreover, the positive issue 
here was that due to the government actually keeping itself aloof from defining defense 
strategy, the Services could decide reductions on their own. 
As previously mentioned, the Treasury led almost all DRs in the UK. The end of 
the Cold War happened alongside an economic recession. At that time, the purpose of the 
DR was to evaluate every pound of defense spending to ensure its efficiency. Because of 
a still uncertain defense policy, the shifting to a capability-based planning, and the 
financial crisis, three points led this review: (1) quantifying defense activity, (2) running 
defense institution privatization through the Private Finance Initiative, and (3) increasing 
defense capability by significantly decreasing costs. Thus, the Defense Costs Study in 
1994 “was conducted and run largely by the Top-Level Budget Holders in conjunction 
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with the Secretary of State for Defence,”96 and consequently this review did not have 
enough coordination and management. 
The SDR of 1997/98 was actually the best attempt of the DR and provided 
defense requirements through 2015. Grattan97 shows the structure of the SDR and how it 
was conducted and analyzed using different tools. This SDR was part of an election 
manifesto of the Labor government in 1997, so the government was an interested party in 
it. Five groups were involved in the process98: (1) the working group, (2) the internal 
studies group (these first two groups include representatives from other government 
departments), (3) the policy and planning steering group, (4) the financial and policy 
management group, and (5) the cabinet. Grattan describes the logical structure for the 
planning assumption of the SDR: “foreign policy  defense policy  roles, missions, 
tasks  resources.”99 Thus, the policy framework was based on foreign policy guidance 
and “formed the basis for future work to ‘identify the specific force structures, 
capabilities, equipment and support required.’”100 Then this framework was translated 
into defense policy with a set of planning assumptions. The working groups should to 
address the following questions101: Planning for what? With and against whom? Where? 
By whom? To do what? Based where? How many concurrent operations? What about 
other attendant structure? (Crisis Management Structure, Rapid Deployment Forces, 
NATO Reaction Forces, Reserves).  
The next point about roles, missions, and tasks had several segments:102 nuclear 
forces, conventional forces (policy framework and structures, capabilities, and 
equipment), infrastructure support, procurement policy, and efficiency (assets). The 
important point was as follows: “Resources were considered last because the process was 
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to be policy, not resources, led.”103 It was clever, because, as Grattan rightly noticed: “If 
the defence policy was derived logically from needs of foreign policy, the Review, it was 
felt, could not be accused of following earlier examples by being constrained to produce 
a defence policy that matched a preordained budget.”104 Moreover, the SDR was the 
most open review, but not just by date. It had significant external inputs from three sets of 
seminars that were open for everyone who wanted to be involved. To sum up, though 
SDR was based on previous defense roles and military tasks, it was a complex process 
that contained a lot of structural changes, involvement of other agencies and civilians, 
new technology, long-term procurements commitments, introduction of defense 
diplomacy (as a new mission). In addition, “SDR has achieved … the realigning of the 
three dimensions of policy with one another.”105 
Finally, in 2010, the British government represented a new National Security 
Strategy and Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR). Besides an uncertain 
strategy and defense restructuring for budget-cutting decisions, the SDSR introduced a 
couple of significant policy changes: a five-year cycle for conducting the SDSR (notice 
the incompatibility with the three-year cycle for the government’s spending review), and 
the idea of shifting to a risk-based strategy. After one year, in 2011, SDSR was examined 
in the movement of execution in 2010 and forward outlook how well 2010 was executed 
and analyzed the effectiveness of future SDSR.106 Thus, there were some challenges of 
execution claimed in three directions107: (1) “Government and Industry in the Future”108: 
to modernize existing weapons platforms for cost-saving could lead to loose capability 
and increase support cost; (2) “Short-Term versus Long-Term Equipment Needs and 
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Force Structures”109: to find a balance between high-cost, long-term procurements and 
the needs for current operations; and to restructure the armed forces subject to keeping 
fighting capability and readiness; (3) “UK Engagement in the World”110: besides national 
interests, for the protection of national value, the UK should have much wider 
commitments and engagement; and uncertainty of future defense scenarios. At the 
projected outlook some challenges in five directions111 were noted:  
(1) “Government and Industry in the Future”112: an emphasis on short-term 
purchases could impair long-term contracts, and use the interoperability of equipment and 
sharing of logistic and support system;  
(2) “Alliances, Partnerships and the Relationship with the United States”113: to 
find a balance between cost-saving and remaining capability into international 
cooperation, and to manage national value and interests object to uncertainty NATO and 
U.S.-UK relations;  
(3) “Government Staffing and Armed Forces Command Structures”114: armed 
forces adaptation for a new command structure (Join Forces Command) and personnel 
changes (including cutting), misunderstanding of the restructuring and transformation of 
the armed forces, challenging in an attempt to enlarge the budgeting responsibility;  
(4) “Future Procurement and Force Development”115: budget challenges for short-
term issues—equipment that will be returning from Afghanistan—and long-term – 
equipment platform: replacement or updated;  
(5) “The Use of Non-Military Power”116: despite the importance of defense 
diplomacy, the challenge of dividing responsibilities and budgets. Thus, the next SDSR 
in 2015 has a good basis for beginning. 
                                                 
109 Ibid., 4. 
110 Ibid., 5. 
111 Ibid., 6–9. 
112 Ibid., 6. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid., 7. 
115 Ibid., 8. 
 43
During all reviews mentioned previously, the clear goal was to cut the budget due 
to the reduction of armed forces and to withdraw forces outside, but retain fighting 
capability. The evaluation of the DR process started based on a capability-based strategy, 
then shifted to a threat-based one, and finally is likely to shift to a risk-based strategy. 
However, the unwillingness of the government and high military authority to provide real 
changes (not just cost-saving) bring almost all DRs to failure. 
B. EVOLUTION OF THE USA DEFENSE REVIEW 
With the end of the Cold War era, many changes occurred in the United States in 
the defense sphere, including the national threats and interests, national and military 
strategy, and forces structure and personnel—and, of course, everything was under the 
budget limitation. 
In 1989, the first significant DR—the Base Force—was conducted. “The changes 
to strategy and force structure that were developed under the Base Force were designed to 
meet the defense needs of the post-Cold War era by replacing Cold War strategy, which 
had focused on deterrence of Soviet aggression and had relied on forward defense, with a 
new strategy focused on regional threats and forward presence.”117 This review 
represented a significant reduction:118 for force structure—25%, in budget authority—
about 10%, in manpower—more than 20%. The Base Force was based on “a regionally 
based strategy that emphasized deterrence, forward presence, and crisis response.”119 
However, this review could not stop a defense budget reduction, and led “to a widening 
gap between strategy, forces, and resources and setting the stage for a number of hard 
choices that would need to be faced in the out years, with modernization and readiness of 
the force being the main ones.”120 
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In 1993, another review was conducted called the Bottom-Up Review (BUR). It 
stated: “[T]he aim of the BUR was to provide ‘a comprehensive review of the nation’s 
defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations.’”121 
Actually, this review was based on a previous one: continue force structure and 
manpower reduction and decrease the defense budget. However, “the BUR redefined the 
meaning of engagement, giving increased rhetorical and policy importance to U.S. 
participation in multilateral peace and humanitarian operations and setting the stage for 
an increased operational tempo and rate of deployment, even as force and budgetary 
reductions continued.”122 This review failed and suffered a lot of criticism. Thus, policy 
analysts123 discovered at least seven shortcomings: (1) the proposed force structure had 
not been balanced with the available defense budget; (2) the force capabilities were 
overrated; (3) there was decreasing expenditure on procurement, operation, and 
maintenance, “increasing the tempo of operations by expanding commitments,”124 which 
led to the creation of a “hollow force”125; (4) an obsolete system without perspective  
replacement led to a technology gap; (5) a continuation to decrease expenditure on the 
missile defense program; (6) the “force lacks a sufficient capability to project maritime 
power overseas;”126 (7) the sham confirmation of cutting the defense budget under the 
government vision. Moreover, policy analysts claim that failure of the BUR is “based on 
faulty assumption concerning the mission of the armed forces:”127 “the shape and size of 
U.S. forces should be based on peace enforcement and intervention,”128 and “the ‘armed 
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forces… can play a significant role in’ addressing ‘economic danger to our [the USA] 
national security.’”129 Thus, the armed forces created were unaffordable at that time.  
The next attempt at the DR in the United States was the first Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) which was conducted in 1997130 and was based on threat-based planning. 
The decision about the four-year DR cycle was made later in 1999.131 Thus, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) should conduct “a comprehensive examination (to be 
known as a “quadrennial defense review”) of the national defense strategy, force 
structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of 
the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining 
and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense 
program for the next 20 years.”132 First, fourteen specific issues were defined for the 
DOD, such as “a comprehensive discussion on the national defense strategy of the United 
States and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy at a low-to-moderate 
level of risk.”133 The important issue in conducting the QDR is that the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) provides an assessment of each QDR and shows main 
critical points which the DOD tries to improve in the next QDR. 
For the 1997 QDR, the GAO reported more than ten critical points,134 which 
include (1) the lack of full alternative analysis does not provide suitable force structure 
for the defense strategy implemented; (2) despite wide analysis of possible military 
operations and the potential impact of key assumptions, force assessment was based on 
the BUR; (3) “only one of the three major force assessments modeled any force structure 
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alternatives;”135 (4) no full analysis of “the potential effects of new technologies and war-
fighting concepts on DOD’s planned force structure;”136 (5) “this approach did not 
always provide a mission focus that examined trade-offs or facilitated a fundamental 
reassessment of modernization needs in light of emerging threats and technological 
advances;”137 (6) “the modernization and force assessment panels conducted most of 
their work independently and concurrently, which hampered their ability to explore 
linkages and trade-offs between force structure and modernization alternatives.”138 In 
addition, the failure causes of this QDR were an absence of balance between strategy, 
forces, and resources and an underestimation of resources; as a result, there was a lack of 
defense expenditures. 
In 2001, the QDR had already produced a four-year cycle. The DOD introduced 4 
more areas of risks in the QDR139: operational, force management, future challenges, and 
institutional. The GAO discovered that the increasing involvement of high authorities 
“led to the development of a new defense strategy that underscores the need to transform 
the forces to better meet the changing threats of a new security environment.”140 
However, the weaknesses of this review were vague legislation and an overly tight 
timetable. Additional weaknesses included “not always a clear link between the study 
team assignments and the legislatively required issues; the thoroughness of the analysis 
on these required issues varied considerably; and the assessment of force structure needs 
had some significant limitations.”141 Thus, comprehensive information was not provided, 
and the “DOD lacks assurances that it has optimized its force structure and investment 
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priorities to balance short-term and long-term risks.”142 Thereby, the first issue here, in 
cycle review, is to adjust the legislation, the QDR’s scope and agenda. 
In 2006, the QDR and subsequent reviews were claimed to have been based on 
capability-based planning, but the continued budget-driven defense planning process of 
the United States makes this assertion problematic. This shift became a problem due to 
the absence of necessary guidelines and instructions. The GAO defined the following 
strengths of the QDR: “sustained involvement of senior DOD officials, extensive 
collaboration with interagency partners and allied countries, and a database to track 
implementation of initiatives.”143 However, these strengths were counterbalanced by the 
following weaknesses: “DOD did not conduct a comprehensive, integrated assessment of 
different options for organizing and sizing its forces to provide needed capabilities…; 
DOD did not provide a clear analytical basis for its conclusion that it had the appropriate 
number of personnel to meet current and projected demands…; the risk assessments... did 
not fully apply DOD’s risk management framework because DOD had not developed 
assessment tools to measure risk.”144 Thereby, due to the lack of guidance, new planning 
had an “approach that focuses on capabilities to meet a range of threats rather than on the 
allocation of forces for specific adversaries.”145 
In 2010, the QDR represented a new strategic plan based on an analysis of current 
operations (in Afghanistan and Iraq) and directed at developing capabilities to meet 
threats in the future. Again, fiscal issues play a main role in the QDR, especially in the 
long-term perspective. The 2010 QDR based on the 2008 National Defense Strategy 
“described an environment shaped by globalization, violent extremist movements, rogue 
and unstable states, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”146 Three different 
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sets of scenarios were evaluated for forces in the midterm. However, the GAO reported 
that “of the 17 required reporting items, DOD addressed 6, partially addressed 7, and did 
not directly address 4.”147 The last one “included items addressing the anticipated roles 
and missions of the reserve component, the advisability of revisions to the Unified 
Command Plan, the extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more 
theaters, and the appropriate ratio of combat to support forces.”148 Moreover, the GAO 
claimed that its conclusion and recommendations for the last QDR needed to remain the 
same in this review. Thus, the DOD did not consider that the GAO opinions and last 
pitfalls obtained new problems to the pitfalls noted in the last review.  
Besides the failure of QDRs in the United States, its advantages were the 
involvement of civilian and military advisers and the GAO assessment of each review to 
avoid future mistakes. However, as in the UK practice, the DR in the United States failed 
too. The issue here is the DOD’s unwillingness to accept recommendations and attempts 
to make a significant force transformation, but remaining status quo for the majority of 
the defense program. Moreover, the necessity of continuous update guides, and 
instructions for development and conducting the DR, creates additional problems.  
C. MISTAKE ANALYSIS OF CONDUCTED DEFENSE REVIEW IN MDU 
The DR in Ukraine is understood as a special strategic monitoring and analysis 
procedure during the strategic planning process. The result of the DR should be the main 
information base for the development of the National Security Strategy and for strategies 
of each component of national defense security, including War Security Strategy. 
However, current legislation does not properly define the mechanism of review, because 
no unified methodology nor approaches to implementation have been specified. The only 
exception is the sphere of defense and military building.149 
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The need for the DR stipulates the following: (1) emergence of new threats to the 
national interests of Ukraine as a result of changes in the military-political situation; (2) 
revision of the guidance of the state policy priorities of Ukraine on foreign and domestic 
policy in the sphere of national security and defense; (3) specification of strategic 
objectives for the development of the AFU and other components of the security and 
defense sector, and other reasons, which will significantly impact the national security 
and defense of Ukraine. 
For the first time in Ukraine, the DR was conducted in 2003–2004. It became the 
basis for the SDB150 and the State Program of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006–
2011.151 The main disadvantages of this DR were as follows: low reliability and 
incomplete data, limitation of condition and prospects of reform, and development of 
only the AFU without the other agencies in this field. Evidence of the low reliability of 
the results of the DR is the significant difference between qualitative and quantitative 
indicators for the SDB152 and the White Book 2005.153 The main reasons for these 
differences are the lack of effective mechanisms of strategic and defense planning at that 
time; including (1) strategic monitoring and analysis; (2) unwillingness and unavailability 
of OMF units to carry out DR; (3) poor coordination on the part of the NSDCU and the 
CMU; (4) the poor quality of the input data from primary sources; (5) poor scientific 
support—the lack of effective methods, techniques, and research models. 
Thus, the first DR gave the Ukrainian army the opportunity to gain experience of 
systematic but not transparent defense planning in the state by the approximate standards 
in the leading countries of the world. According to the results of the DR, a series of 
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reforms were made in 2005–2008. At the same time, through a series of circumstances, 
the review had certain shortcomings, which further adversely affected the implementation 
of its results. Actual defense expenditures were significantly lower, causing planned and 
initiated reforms to fail. First, equipping the army with modern AME was never 
completed. Next, problematic issues are recruitment for the army of contract military 
personnel, solutions for social problems of military personnel, and logistics. Thus, the 
development of realistic long-term development strategy of the AFU has failed and its 
management as well. 
Actually, the first review contained only the inspection of the AFU, but at that 
time represented a significant achievement. From the first DR, changes in the security 
sphere around Ukraine and its policy have occurred. The situation in Ukraine today is 
much different from 2003 –2004: the economic situation has changed, and the situation in 
the AFU has worsened, especially since 2009. New political realities faced by Ukraine 
require clearer directions and mechanisms for ensuring military security. The active 
phase of ATO is being conducted. Thus, the flaws are clearly visible not only in the 
defense planning, but in the training of personnel, mobilization training, the development 
of DIC, the existing strategic reserves, and other flaws. 
The next attempt of the DR could be called the Comprehensive review of the 
security sector. This review had to cover all law enforcement agencies, and ought to be a 
basis for the creation of the National Security Strategy of Ukraine154 in 2007. 
Unfortunately it did not, because it failed at the beginning of its conduction. 
However, the third DR, that ought to have been conducted between September 
2008 and October 2009,155 but barely finished in 2010, had a list of positive changes. 
This review was initiated by the MDU and the GS and ought to be a basis for creating 
The State Complex Program of Reformation and Development of the Armed Forces of 
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Ukraine Until 2017.156 However, the DR came at a time of economic crisis and a 
worsening crisis in the development of the AFU. The first has greatly complicated the 
handling of the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, and the MFU forecast indicators for 
funding the defense sector for the long term. This factor led to the breakdown of the 
timing of the review. Although the DR started opportunely, it didn’t finish in an 
appropriate way. First the middle-term program157 ended in 2011, but the successive 
program—The State Complex Program of Reformation and Development of the Armed 
Forces of Ukraine Until 2017158 —was approved just in 2013. However, in May 2014, 
this program has been suspended.159 This DR differs from previous analogues because of 
the involvement of the non-governmental expert environment, such as the Razumkov 
Centre; the Centre military and security policy; the Center of research in the army, 
conversion and disarmament; and methodological assistance of foreign experts, in 
particular, the Geneva Centre for the democratic control of armed forces. 
According to Korendovych,160 who was at that time Director of the Department 
of Military Policy and Strategic Planning of the MDU, the most typical problems in 
solving the problems of the DR were as follows: (1) significant duration of DR; (2) lack 
of implementation discipline in realization of the organization-methodological 
recommendations, Plan of basis activities, and Plan-prospectus of draft of the SDB; (3) 
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the lack of trained personnel; (4) inferiority of the legislative acts and normative 
documents of the applied and planning procedures. He argues that: 
The most characteristic and significant risks that affect the achievement of 
the specific objectives of the reforms in the sphere of national security and 
defense of Ukraine are as follows: ‘the human factor’ (the level of 
knowledge, experience, subjectivity); poor choice of ways to achieve its 
strategic goals, a fundamental change of goals in the phase of 
implementation; resources, especially financial; a widening gap between 
the theory and practice of operational art; the limited capacity of the 
national economy in the manufacture of modern AME for defense 
needs.161 
He proposes the united scheme of defense planning (Figure 1) and claims that for 
the purpose of reducing the amount of time to conduct the DR, to make in advance “the 
evaluation procedures of the military-political situation, status, abilities/capabilities of the 
AFU, and the state’s capacity resources to meet the needs of defense.”162 He suggests 
reporting the results as separate documents.  





Figure 1.  The United Scheme of Defense Planning163  
However, this scheme is cumbersome, demands a lot of time and personnel, and 
includes several middle-term documents that are inflexible and need continuous 
adjustments and amendments, but could be easily denied or replaced, as was mentioned 
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in Chapter II. Finally, the most important point is responsibility. Unfortunately, 
responsibility has never been defined in an appropriate way, and nobody is willing to take 
responsibility for failing to fulfill the plan.  
Moreover, according to the independent assessment of interim results, the 
methodology of the DR was judged to be broken. Thus, experts from the Razumkov 
Centre164 revealed some shortcomings of this methodology that were due to the lack of 
effective strategic management at the state level, the incompleteness of the process of 
improving the organizational and functional structure of the MDU and the GS staff, not 
well developed (specific procedures) communication and coordination of activities 
involved in the review of ministries and agencies, and so forth:  
1. ambiguity of the conceptual apparatus  
2. uncertainty of the starting point of review  
3. insufficient detail of total technology of review  
4. failure to comply with the general rules of work with hierarchical 
structures  
5. not enough clear definition of the algorithm forming scenario  
6. imperfect methods of risk assessment  
7. ambiguous approach to identifying the necessary resources  
8. insufficient level of detail of interim results 
Moreover, experts from the Razumkov Centre165 argue that: 
The assessment of prospects of development of the military-political situation in 
the world and around Ukraine for the period till 2025 were not quite complete and 
adequate;  
The findings from the analysis of the military-political situation only partially and 
indirectly indicate potential sources of threats (what actually indicates the current 
situation in the Southwest region of Ukraine); and 
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The list of declared threats is very general, unstructured and does not provide 
technological relating to subsequent stages of formation scenarios and the identification 
of capabilities.  
Finally, it is important to admit that both the SDBs have little information about 
the OMF, mostly through the absence of defense planning and its structures. Thus, the 
DR is almost based on the assessment of the AFU, and just partly on the OMF. The 
experience of the DR should be expanded into the entire security sector. This is essential 
to ensure binding strategic documents that formed the basis of the DR with budget 
development, adoption, and execution in the national security of Ukraine, and the direct 
impact of strategic documents on these processes.  
D. RANGE OF PROBLEMS IN MDU RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MOU 
ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF THE DEFENCE 
REVIEW 
After three failed attempts at the DR in the MDU, the Guidelines on the 
Organization and Conduct of the Defense Review166 were approved. These Guidelines 
establish the organizational and methodological basis for the preparation and conduction 
of the DR in the MDU, the GS, and the AFU. This is the first attempt to make the 
Guidelines, which defines purposes of the DR, stages, authorities, and support. However, 
the responsibility is missing here again. This section provides some critical points of 
these Guidelines. 
The guidelines state the main purposes of the DR:167 (1) assessment of the 
existing capacity of the state to respond to a wide range of modern challenges and threats 
in the military sphere, (2) definition of the development strategy of the Sector security 
and defense in the long term, (3) strategy harmonization with the available resources of 
the state, (4) determination of the principles of transformation of the AFU. However, the 
guidelines do not tie to other military organizations (they do not have even defense 
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planning units) nor provide a guide for a one-sided DR. Unfortunately, the DR is carried 
out mostly manually and provides a view of existent authority.  
The Expert Commission of the MDU168 is the main collegiate body on the 
conduct of the DR, and it is at the head of the First Deputy Chief of Ministry of 
Defense.169 The weakness here is that members of that Expert Commission are 
temporary. Thus, it is necessary to determine permanent members of the Commission. 
Those personnel should be chosen from experts who are competent and experienced in 
defense planning, finance, logistics, staffing, and personnel. It would be ideal if they 
passed some courses abroad, especially on defense planning, because such training would 
lead to a broader view on questions. Permanency is important because it provides 
responsibility for results. 
There are three stages of the DR170: organizational-preparatory, main (executive), 
and final. The shortcoming is the absence of even a rough timeline for this process. Two 
DRs in Ukraine lasted one and a half years. Thus, these DRs lost its urgency. For 
instance, when the first DR (2003 –2004) took the personnel and capability of thirty-two 
army corps (Crimea locus) into account, most units of the corps were reformed and 
relocated. 
In the organizational-preparatory stage, the main goals171 are the forming of 
working bodies, defining their place on interagency and agency levels, and implementing 
activities of the DR. Thus, at this stage lies the fundamental causes of a superficial and 
biased DR. There is no clear definition of the officials responsible for the implementation 
of measures. Implementing temporary working groups requires training such groups, 
ensuring paperwork approval for questions that arise during working groups, organizing 
their interaction with other agencies, and defining responsibilities.  
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This stage in the first and the second DR was reduced to the carrying out of 
roundtables, presentations, seminars, lectures, and meetings. However, all these activities 
are only recorded, but not actually implemented. The majority of those designated 
generally did not understand what they needed to do. Everything came down to the 
regular division of the GS and services who performed the work and the approval and 
coordination of existing documents entrusted to time individuals who could not manage 
the situation. Thus, the results were just several advanced slogans. 
In the MDU, a Project-Plan172 was drawn up for designing the SDB and approved 
by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. The Guidelines state an approximate section 
(subsection) of that Plan. However, it provides information just about the AFU, and 
initially does not contain any information and data about the OMF. Again the problem of 
interconnection arises. 
The guidelines define four main procedures173 of defense planning (figure 2): (1) 
assessment of security environment, (2) forces planning, (3) resource planning, (4) risk 
assessment. 
Assessing the security environment includes the following174: identifying 
prospects of development of military-political situation; specifying the list of challenges 
and threats in the defense sphere; forming on this list basis scenarios of hazards, where 
the AFU would be used as a component of the defense forces. However, only the AFU 
and no OMF is covered. This procedure includes the following tasks175: assessing 
development prospects of military-political situation; identifying actual and potential 
risks and threats of a military nature; developing hazardous scenarios for Ukraine; and 
clarifying the likely scenarios and situations for planning of using the AFU, taking into 
account the escalation of risks and threats. 
                                                 
172 Ibid., Article 4.3. 
173 Ibid., Article 5. 
174 Ibid., Article 5.2. 
175 Ibid. 
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However, these activities should be done by using the IAS for a modeling 
situation (for instance, JWARS—Joint Warfare System) or IAS which can carry out a 
SWOT analysis (IAS “Resource”). This will allow for the consideration of all factors and 
realistically determining typical patterns which are necessary when performing tasks. 
Otherwise, the current situation in the Ukraine is a result of past mistakes in defining 
security threats: the main combat units were removed from the Crimea, and combat units 
in Donetsk and Lugansk regions were withdrawn and dissolved. 
 
Figure 2.  List and Reciprocal Relationships between Procedures in the Process 
of Task Execution of Defense Review (Option).176 
 
                                                 
176 Ibid., Article 5. 
 59
The procedure of forces planning177 is based on the list of scenarios of defense 
forces and requirements of their operational (military) capabilities. This procedure 
includes an assessment of existing forces, a determination of whether their capacity 
requirements are up to the tasks of the new scenarios, and the difference between 
required and available capabilities. The basis for force planning uses a method based on 
capabilities. Unfortunately, the MDU and the GS do not have one clear and single 
definition of the term “capability.” “Capability,” “ability,” and “possibility” mean almost 
the same. Moreover, it is nonsense to use a capability-based method, instead of threat-
based planning, especially when Ukraine currently has a real threat from Russia. 
The next mistake into that procedure is typical patterns (units) at different levels, 
which are used for determination of the operational capabilities. These typical patterns 
are accounted with personnel for a special (war) period, so are fully equipped and 
provided as well. However, most of the military units have staff of peacetime, because 
the state does not have a special period178 (full mobilization or war condition). A typical 
pattern is actually ideal, but very different from the real unit, because of personnel, 
equipment, readiness, and supply. Moreover, such planning is far from real structure, and 
does not take into account terms, and the amount of equipment which should be moved, 
effectively ignoring logistic problems. Thus, this is a strategic mistake to create any 
scenarios initially based on ideal conditions where it is taken into account that units are 
manned, fully equipped, ready and actually located in necessary positions.  
The current system of resource planning179 has a lot of shortcomings. First, in this 
case the resource is just money and nothing more. Second, determining the amount of 
money for providing defense needs considers the forecast of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) of the state, the annual inflation rate and the inflation of the price index, as well as 
the legislative and regulatory framework requirements for funding in a special period. 
However, the government usually provides forecasts during the autumn (Table 3 in 
                                                 
177 Ibid. Article 5.3. 
178 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Law of October 21, 1993, № 3543-XII, About Mobilization 
Preparation and Mobilization. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3543-12. 
179 Ibid. Article 5.4. 
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Chapter 1 provides some examples), so time is limited. Moreover, the Guidelines state180 
that the reliability of the forecast of defense expenditures is supplied by the scientific 
approach, using multiple information sources, both governmental and non-governmental 
analyses of independent experts. Thus, defense expenditures are defined not by the needs 
of the AFU, but by these independent experts. A rhetorical question arises: How much do 
non-governmental experts know about the credibility and reliability of the forecast of 
defense expenditures? And, does the MDU define a long-term forecast for defense 
expenditures and direct it to the MFU, but not get involved with the MFU’s experts to 
calculate these figures? Finally, assessment of the current capabilities of its armed forces 
to perform tasks in all scenarios is to determine the degree of compliance and the 
difference between the required and available capabilities. The evaluation determined by 
the amount of resources needed for achieving the required capabilities (abilities) long 
term (five to ten years) are calculated as part of the life cycle (formation, support, 
capacity, deprivation) and the main categories of capabilities (see Figure 3). However, it 
is difficult to compare unequal parameters and indicators—typical patterns differ greatly 
from real units. 
                                                 
180 Ibid.  
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Figure 3.  The Distribution of Capabilities Across Categories of the Life Cycle 
(option) 
Risk assessment181 is a process of forming conclusions, preparing initial data, and 
supporting decision-making through the following: evaluating the tasks of the AFU in the 
context of expected challenges and threats to Ukraine in the long term; the capabilities 
which the AFU needs to reach, taking into account the existing situation and the capacity 
of the state to meet the needs of defense; the perspective model of the AFU and 
conceptual views on the strategy to achieve it; data sources for defense planning in the 
AFU, as part of the defense forces; the risks of achieving certain capabilities; and 
management in the process of achieving them. At this stage it is possible to draw faulty 
                                                 
181 Ibid. Article 5.5. 
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or weak conclusions, as it was previously. The DR should be practically money-driven, 
otherwise it is meaningless. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Chapter III discussed British and U.S. practices of conducting the DR, analyzed 
the flaws in conducting the DR in the MDU, and provided recommendations for the 
MDU in the organizing and conducting of the DR. 
On the assumption of the previously-stated summary the DR could be defined 
successful if the result brought some effective changes in strategy, policy, and money. 
This chapter defined the main causes of the DR failure based on the best practices of 
conducting it, and described some critical moments in the United States’ and the United 
Kingdom’s experiences in conducting the DR. Unfortunately, even the best practice of 
the DR shows that it has almost never been successful. Something was always absent: the 
political will for changes, or the ability to change money (increase or decrease funding). 
The DR is a necessary and important process for defense planning to conduct 
economic analyses and determine funding to meet strategic objectives. The current 
situation in Ukraine requires a qualitative transformation of the system of power relations 
at national, regional, and local levels. The need is not only to consolidate the 
achievements of Ukraine as a sovereign state, but also to continue developing its armed 
forces and conducting in-depth and effective reforms. That should be linked with budget 
capability to achieve specific priorities, not overblown ambitions.  
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IV. INTERDEPENDENCE OF BUDGET AND DEFENSE 
PLANNING 
In generating a list of challenges facing the AFU, the economic capabilities of the 
state play a significant role, because the number of tasks is variable in the planning 
process, as is the process of direct activity of the AFU. The negative impact of economic 
factors reduces the number of possible tasks, which are reflected in defensive plans. This 
negatively affects the level of military security of the country. Rational allocation and 
efficient use of limited public resources to the needs of the AFU is one of the main tasks 
of defense planning. Therefore, financial and resource support of defense needs is the 
main factor that directly affects all planning and execution of tasks in the system of 
defense planning. 
Short-term defense planning in the AFU is carried out cyclically and is consistent 
with the budget process in Ukraine. In recent years, defense planning documents have 
been widely used at all stages of budget planning in the MDU. Thus, the process allows 
reason to determine the financial needs of the AFU, more efficient allocation of financial 
resources according to needs, and so on. However, the MDU and the GS are not able to 
provide efficient defense planning, nor to properly prioritize and quickly respond to shift 
money or needs. 
One of the main tasks of the MDU is to rationally allocate and efficiently use 
scarce state resources for the priorities of the AFU, especially in today’s Ukraine. 
Although these tasks are clearly defined in the conceptual apparatus of legislation which 
governs the activities of the MDU in defense and budget planning, unfortunately, they 
were built on old Communist legacy concepts, and therefore predictably fail. As a result, 
when defense expenditures represent allocation among categories Personal and 
Maintenance, Training, and Investment, category Personal and Maintenance includes 70–
90%. However, this number is too large because of the inappropriate allocation of 
subcategories. An idealized system should have one third for each of these three 
categories. 
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Thus, the interdependence of budget and defense planning require separate 
treatment, but this chapter discusses three issues that touch upon defense planning: how 
budget and defense programs exist together, how to plan and execute financial resources 
for the MDU, and how special fund challenges defense planning. 
A. BUDGET AND DEFENSE PROGRAMS 
Implementing the system of defense planning of the AFU has become a 
transitional stage from the planning system “tools—measures—result of using funds” to 
“measures—funds—the result of implementing of measures and using funds.” In 
addition, there is a need to classify the expenditures of the AFU by categories: personnel, 
maintenance, training, and investment in the development of military armament and 
equipment and infrastructure. This is quite difficult to do using existing budget 
classifications. According to the About Budget Classification,182 the budget of the MDU 
is divided into budget programs, which includes codes of economical classification of 
expenditures (CECE).183 However, publically available information about the annual law 
About the State Budget of Ukraine is scarce. For instance, according to Annex 3 of About 
the State Budget of Ukraine for 2014,184 the budget of the MDU represents seven budget 
programs. Table 2 is an example of expenditures in the general fund (the special fund has 
the same indicators and distribution). Thus, expenditures are divided into consumption 
and development, and two areas—salary (without tax charges), and utilities and energy—
are selected from the consumption expenditures. The budget of the MDU is absolutely 
non-detailed for public access. Table 2 shows that just names of budget programs and 
total sums of expenditures are published. The limited information inside of budget 
programs is available only for some agencies related to defense sphere. However, even 
the unrestricted information of these budget programs is not detailed, because defense 
                                                 
182 Ministry of Finance of Ukraine. Order on January 14, 2011, № 11. About Budget Classification. 
http://www.minfin.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article%3Fart_id=356065&cat_id=355990. 
183 Ibid.  
184 Verchovna Rada of Ukraine. Law on January 16, 2014, № 719-VII. About the State Budget of 
Ukraine for 2014. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/719-18. 
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expenditures inside are divided by the CECE and shows only the total sum of expenditure 
by these CECE. 
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Table 2.   Distribution of Expenditure of General Funds of the State Budget of Ukraine for 2014 for MDU, Thousand 
Hryvna 
 General Fund 









The MDU, of them: 13,677,465.7 12,459,018.5 7,495,064.6 1,232,852.8 1,218,447.2 
Authority of the AFU 225,077.9 225,077.9 164,003.3 4,145.9  
Support of the AFU and training of troops  11,319,392.7 10,746,732.6 6,298,621.3 1,213,716.8 572,660.1
Medical treatment, rehabilitation and health provisions 
for the personnel of AFU, veterans of military service 
and family members 
685,797.4 685,797.4 427,622.0 14,990.1  
The training of military specialists in higher education 
institutions of I-IV levels of accreditation, professional 
development and retraining of military personnel and 
civil servants, initial military training of youth 
795,704.1 795,704.1 604,818.0   
Development of armament and military equipment of 
the AFU  556,816.3    556,816.3
Building (purchase) accommodation for military 
personnel of the AFU      
Disposal of ammunition and liquid propellants, 
ensuring survivability and fire/explosion safety of 
arsenals, bases and depots of the AFU 
94,677.3 5,706.5   88,970.8
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Therefore, indicators and measures of the directions of development 
(reformation)185 provide an opportunity to plan and track measures of development 
(reformation), detailing the prospective areas of the mid-term defense programs. These 
indicators and measures actually are the input data to determine financing, resource 
provisions, and the timing of the execution of defense programs, as reflected in the 
documents of military planning. Thus, the directions of development (reformation), 
which are defined as the financial and economic calculations in the state defense 
programs, as into the PMD, are allocated to the cluster (sub-cluster). Figure 4 provides 
some example of the cluster (sub-cluster). 
These clusters allow more accurate categorization of expenses for maintenance, 
training, and equipment. Unfortunately, the PMD and such detailed calculations are 
restricted for public access. This is opacity corruption, especially in the acquisition 
process. The amount of corruption in acquisition is currently opened when volunteers are 
involved in the logistics process in the MDU and the GS. The use of clusters allow the 
PMD to be transformed into budget programs, but almost not vice versa (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4 shows that almost 80% of the areas of expenditures are gathered into one budget 
program: “Support of the AFU and training of troops.” All these aspects confirm the need 
for further improvement of the system of defense planning, which would be united in the 
opinion of its organization and implementation, and coordination with budget planning. 
                                                 
185 Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Order on January 19, 2010. № 15, About Approval of the 
Regulation About the Organization and Implementation of Middle-Term and Short-Term Defense Planning 
in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 
 68
 
Figure 4.  Connection Between Clusters (Sub-Clusters186) of Defense Planning 
to Budget Programs 
                                                 
186 Sub-cluster will be open just to clarify necessary information. Full classification is in the Order of 
Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Order on January 19, 2010. № 15, About Approval of the Regulation About 
the Organization and Implementation of Middle-Term and Short-Term Defense Planning in the Ministry of 
Defense of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 
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B. ANALYSIS OF PLANNING AND EXECUTING FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES OF MDU 
According to Asset 2 of the law About the Defense of Ukraine,187 the financing 
needs for defense are carried out exclusively through the state budget. Defense 
expenditures must meet the real needs of defense and be not less than 3% of the expected 
GDP. However, the defense budget does not completely belong to the AFU. Only about 
2.75% does. Moreover, exactly 2% of GDP was dedicated to the needs of the MDU in the 
Decree of the president of Ukraine,188 which adopted The State Program of Development 
of Armed Forces of Ukraine 2006–2011. Besides, as Figure 5 shows, since 1993 it has 
never happened, and the mean value for 1992–2013 is about 1.38% of the GDP. 
Therefore, the chronic underfunding of defense requests leads to a permanent 
accumulation of problems in the development of the system of military security of the 
state, as well as the technical outmodedness the AFU. Thus, the main task for managers 
of budget program is to manage scarce expenditures for discrete expenditures189 (salary, 
medical support, food, utilities, education and so on). Figure 6 shows the evolution of 
defense spending categories: Maintenance, Training, and Investment. Maintenance areas 
include direct and indirect personal expenditures; about 85–90% of Training includes fuel 
costs; and Investments include costs for AME procurement, research and development 
(R&D), and infrastructure.  
                                                 
187 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of Ukraine. Law of December 6, 1991, no. 1932-XII, About the 
Defense of Ukraine. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1932-12. 
188 The President of Ukraine. Decree of December 27, 2005, no. 1862–25/2005. About Decision of the 
National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine from 9th of December 2005 “About the State Program 
of Development of Armed Forces of Ukraine 2006–2011.” 
189 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of Ukraine. Law, Code of Ukraine of June 8, 2010 no.2456-VI Budget 
Code of Ukraine. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2456-17, art 55. 
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Figure 5.  Share the Defense Budget of GDP 1992–2013190 
 
Figure 6.  Defense Spending Category 2005–2014191 
                                                 
190 Analytical dates about budget of Ministry of Defense of Ukraine for 1993–2011 can be found at 
http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws, and statistic dates about Ukrainian GDP can be found at 
http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/. 
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Figure 7 shows the average allocation for these categories. Thus, the Subsistence 
area has about 80% of total expenditures. 
 
Figure 7.  Average Defense Spending Category 2005–2014.192 
Figure 8 shows the dynamics of changing defense expenditures and the GDP from 
2000 –2013. Indicators of defense expenditures demonstrate the annual reduction subject 
to Ukraine’s GDP growth. 
                                                                                                                                                 
191 Analytical data about defense spending category 2011 can be found at White Book 2005–2013 and 










Figure 8.  Dynamic of Changing of Defense Expenditure and GDP 2000–
2013193 
However, based on the SIPRI database,194 Figure 9 represents defense 
expenditures of Ukraine significantly different from Figure 8. The reason is that SIPRI’s 
data includes not just expenditures of the AFU, but of the Pension Funds and the 
intelligence service. 
                                                 
193 Analytical dates about budget of Ministry of Defense of Ukraine for 1993–2011 can be found at 
http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws, and statistic dates about Ukrainian GDP can be found at 
http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/. 
194 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. SIPRI Yearbook: World Armaments and 
Disarmament (Stockholm : New York: Almquist & Wiksell, 1997–2013). http://www.sipri.org/yearbook. 
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Figure 9.  Defense Expenditure 1997–2012195 
According to the Constitution of Ukraine196 and the law About the Organization 
of Defense Planning, budget requests and proposals to the draft of the state budget of 
Ukraine for next year are developed by the MDU. The CMU reviews and refines these 
proposals and includes them in the draft of law, About the State Budget of Ukraine, in the 
structure of the defense budget. Further, the NSCDU coordinates the draft, then submits 
proposals to the president of Ukraine concerning financial provisions for implementing 
measures in the defense area. The VRU considers the amended draft of the law About the 
State Budget of Ukraine, amends, and approves it. In other words, the amount of financial 
support for certain defense programs depends on the decisions of the VRU.  
Thereby, if the state, for whatever reasons, may not fully address the current 
funding activities of certain projects, the same Law provides its correction due to changes 
in short-term defense planning. There is a striking contradiction. On one side, the CMU 
                                                 
195 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. SIPRI Yearbook: World Armaments and 
Disarmament (Stockholm : New York: Almquist & Wiksell, 1997–2013). http://www.sipri.org/yearbook. 
196 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Law of June 28, 1996, № 254k/96-BP, Constitution of Ukraine, 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80. 
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agrees on a program of development for the AFU. That means that its financial needs are 
compared with the capabilities of the economy, and the CMU recognizes the state’s 
ability to satisfy them. However, the VRU approved significantly less financial support 
for the armed forces needs that were approved by the CMU. Thus, the executive and 
legislative branches of the government are not consistent in financing the military sphere.  
Figure 10 shows the analysis of the effectiveness of planning and executing the 
financial resources of the MDU. Thus, the red plot is data of The State Program of 
Development of Armed Forces of Ukraine 2006–2011197; the purple one is About The 
State Complex Program of Reformation and Development of the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine Until 2017198; and the green one represents defense expenditures, approved by 
the CMU.199 The blue one represents real expenditures.200  
Thus, expected expenditures significantly exceed real. These expenditures 
demonstrate that certain plans and projects have not been completed or have been 
postponed for an unknown period of time. Thereby, it was impossible to complete any 
strategic plan since the intermediate tasks could be completed or postponed. Thus, the 
whole pattern of planning cycle collapses due to such expenditures gaps. 
                                                 
197 President of Ukraine. Decree of December 27, 2005, № 1862–25/2005 (restricted) About Decision 
of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on December 9, 2005 “About the State Program 
of Development the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006–2011.” 
198 President of Ukraine. Decree of September 2, 2013, № 479/2013, About Decision of the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on September 2, 2013 “About the State Complex Program of 
Reformation and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Until 2017.” 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/479/2013. 
199 Cabinet Ministry of Ukraine. Decree on July 7, 2010, № 568, About the approval of the forecast 
expenditures from the general fund of the state budget for the needs of defense up to 2023. 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/568-2010-%D0%BF and data from Table 2. 





Figure 10.  Defense Expenditures 2006–2017 
C. SPECIAL FUND—UNCERTAINTY OF DEFENSE PLANNING 
In accordance with the budget code, the Budget consists of general and special 
funds.201 The special fund has always attracted attention for its specificity. This fund 
contains revenues for a specific purpose and its distribution by CECE202 to implements 
the corresponding expenditure in accordance with the legislation and priority activities 
related to the MDU. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, legacy funding in many cases did not meet 
the needs of Ukraine’s army. Defense resources (surplus ammunition, cumbersome 
system of military education, facilities provided for the use of nuclear weapons, and so 
                                                 
201 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Law of July 8, 2010, № 2456-VI, article 13, Budget Code of 
Ukraine. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2456-17. 
202 Ministry of Finance of Ukraine. Order on January 14, 2011, № 11. About Budget Classification. 
http://www.minfin.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article%3Fart_id=356065&cat_id=355990. 
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on) were useless or unnecessary. Thus, reducing (redundant) immovable and movable 
property could be an additional resource for defense reforms if it is a profitable 
realization. The question arose as to who should be engaged in the marketing of surplus 
military property: special state agencies or the MDU? The result was that the MDU 
should fill part of the annual budget, adding to its special fund for the implementation 
unusual for the AFU commercial functions (Figure 11). However, replenishing the 
special fund requires certain commanders (chiefs) to pay considerable attention to 
commercial activities of their military units. This does not meet the purpose of these 
military units, and engenders corruption. Under the guise of economic activity, some 
commanders solve personal problems at the expense of available military resources. In 
addition, some commanders are illicitly using the lookup infrastructure. 
 
Figure 11.  Structure of Special Fund of the MDU 
The MDU is entitled to incur expenditures within the limits of and for the account 
of the relevant receipts to the special fund, and to estimate its own revenues without 
making corresponding amendments to the law About the State Budget of Ukraine. Thus, 
























the VRU or the CMU. This explains to some extent the shortfall in the revenues of the 
special fund. Moreover, because of complex approval procedures of selling AME and 
military facilities across the State Property Fund of Ukraine, it is difficult to execute 
receiving revenue for the special fund due to auction sale of military properties or 
equipment. Figure 12 shows the appropriation and execution of special funds in the 
budget of the MDU during 2005–2013 (according to appropriations). In 2005 alone the 
amount of the approved special fund was executed, in 2008 (62.5%) and 2013 (87.7%) 
the special fund received more or less appropriate revenue (Figure 13). Thus, due to 
inefficiency of economic activity, problems in control of military property, and 
corruption, filling the special fund most years received less than half of its planned 
volume. 
 
Figure 12.  Appropriation and Execution Distribution of Special Fund of Budget 
of the MDU During 2005–2013203 
                                                 















Figure 13.  Rate of Execution of Special Funds of MDU Budget During 2005–
2013204 
However, the plan for the special fund is still complete, including long-term 
plans, which are practically impossible. Activities which are funded from the special fund 
depend on the timing and amount of received revenue. This creates a problem in 
executing these activities. Thus, about half of the planned activities will not be executed 
through the risk of the special fund. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter shows that the main weakness of planning is confusing and non-
detailed. The defense programs are detailed enough, but classified; whereas the budget 
programs are open but non-transparent. The MDU used to claim and accuse the MFU of 
failing to provide financial resources for the AFU. Thus, managers should be able to 
manage their existing resources efficiently. Moreover, the biggest problem is leadership 
misunderstanding the necessity of planning for what they have, not what they want to 
have. Otherwise the mistakes of the last decade will be repeated. Finally, the MDU 
should eliminate the special fund. As a last resort, the special fund could be retained just 
for medicine and education only. 
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V. ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE FORCE MANAGEMENT 
Currently, automated control systems at the operational-strategic level and 
compatibility with automated control of the military authorities at the tactical level are 
extremely important for successfully commanding forces. Currently, the need to improve 
management effectiveness of the AFU creates the Unified Information-Analytical System 
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and its elements. The IAS “Resource” is an existing 
software system which was initially created for defense planning support, but 
unfortunately cannot sustain the decision-making process. This section discusses the 
evolution of the IAS “Resource,” causes of its failure, and proposals of further it existing. 
Since the creation of the AFU, the creation of a unified management system has 
been given significant consideration. Actually, since 1992, research institutes of the AFU, 
academic and research institutions of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, and 
industry have carried out more than 100 studies and more than 40 engineering designs in 
this area.205 However, “only about 20% of these work have reached the stage of 
prototyping, trials, and testing, and about 80% of them have not been accepted, and were 
therefore, suspended at various stages of execution of work: conceptual and technical 
design (40%), development of design documentation (40%).”206 
Moreover, much of the information-analytical systems (IAS) of accounting, 
accounting data, and databases have been established for more than 20 years of the AFU. 
In other military formations of Ukraine, significant numbers of IAS were created as well, 
in various forms. Thus, all agencies involved in defense and national security tried to 
create their own IAS. Unfortunately, it did not succeed in either the AFU or other 
formations. Today, each agency uses its own IAS, most of which are closed (restricted) 
and have limited access both within the agency and between them. Thus, different IASs 
are involved in defense and national security, such as accounting, personnel, 
mobilization, and the management of vehicles, armament, and other military equipment.  
                                                 




However, no one analytical system can unite all systems and allow 
communication of data across databases. This is a critical need in Ukraine. In 2014–2015, 
four waves of mobilization were declared. All agencies and structural units spent a lot of 
time coordinating surveys of military personnel, vehicles, equipment, industrial 
capability, and so on, in one or another agencies covered by the full database. Moreover, 
different IASs within the MDU demanded additional staff for setting up and maintaining 
these systems, which require proper education and training (often this is an extra cost, 
because almost all software is developed and maintained by private firms). However, 
IASs are affiliated neither with the other agencies nor even among themselves (for 
example: IAS “Mobilization training,” IAS “Personnel accounting,” IAS “Transport 
accounting”). Additionally, most IASs were created only for WinXP or Win2000 and 
only a few can be converted to latest operating systems Win7, 8, or 10, or other operating 
systems like Linux. 
Since 2000, the state could not maintain a huge inventory of equipment and 
weapons. This was needed to make fundamental decisions regarding the reform of the 
country and the Army in conditions of limited and insufficient funding. At that time, the 
country had not yet decided its direction. The majority of authorities of the state and the 
MDU cautioned against the introduction of a system of defense planning and was even 
hostile to the introduction of this idea. Shelest207 can be considered the founder of 
defense planning in the AFU. He led the AFU since the birth of defense planning 
structures, the introduction of the IAS “Resource,” and approved the law About the 
Organization of Defense Planning.208 However, this was an incorrect understanding; it 
was not actually planning, but force management. 
The IAS “Resource” was created as an IAS in support of defense planning, but 
there has never been software for it. Shelest, the conceptualizer of the IAS “Resource,” 
felt that this system would support defense planning. However, it was just a force 
                                                 
207 “Defense and Security Policy Center.” http://defpol.org.ua/site/index.php/ru/our-team. 
208 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Law of November 18, 2004, № 2198-IV, About the Organization of 
Defense Planning. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2198-15. 
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management tool, but fell into decay under poor management and improper use. Thus, 
the future of this system is rather questionable. 
A. ESSENCE OF THE IAS “RESOURCE” 
Shelest guided the legislative acts, regulations, and target programs, created 
patterns for processing and summarizing data, and established appropriate structural units 
into the GS and the MDU. Also, appropriate units were created in services of the AFU 
and the operational commands with certain powers and structure. Military units had 
separate staff officers. Such officers’ responsibility was to collect and process 
information, develop relevant reports of force management, and provide primary dates 
(fill template of units) for the IAS “Resource.” However, his achievement failed because 
it used the Soviet approach. 
While preparing for a DR in 2003, an analysis of existing software tools for 
collecting and processing data indicated the impossibility of its implementation for 
defense planning in Ukraine. Thus, the creation of the IAS “Resource” began in 2003. At 
that time, it was the advanced information system. This system creates a database that 
contains information about the condition and value of maintaining each military unit, 
analyzes the current conditions of the AFU, and identifies quantitative and qualitative 
indicators. All databases were concentrated in the IPCDP. For 2004–2011, the IPCDP 
worked in two main directions:  
(1) Remaining in working condition IAS “Resource,” accumulation and creation a 
database on item (nomenclature), the amendments of software and technological 
support for the work of the IAS in the units are the main tasks. 
(2) Collection and preliminary analysis of received information, providing decision-
making about the results of the IAS “Resource” working, accounting of weapons 
and military equipment, conditions, capacity, and capabilities of military units, 
and capabilities to carry out combat tasks, and tasks in the interests of the 
protection of civil and territorial defense in their (units) respective regions. But 
this collection was not consistent with the terms of other documents (annual 
financial accounting and preparation of annual training plan (training, operation)) 
and usually prepared earlier. Thus, it is not allowed to fully enter the appropriate 
date in the needs for the next year and as a conclusion had been perfunctory and 
false indicators of needs and appropriate solutions usually been wrong. 
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The main purpose of the IAS “Resource” is to substantiate, model, and forecast 
defense expenditures. For instance, it includes such tools as: (1) information modeling of 
perspective structure of the AFU, (2) resource support of substantiation of annual events 
in the reform of the AFU, (3) the distribution of expenditures of the state budget of 
Ukraine for the needs of the AFU. Table 4 represents software complexes of the IAS 
“Resource.”  
There are three functional subsystems in the IAS “Resource” (Figure 14):  
(1) Accounting of Defense Resources and Monitoring Their Condition is for 
“collection, accumulation, and preservation of factual and normative data 
about the provision of military units, their costs, and low-key review these 
data.”209 
(2) Structure Modeling of Defense Resources and Definition of Defense 
Expenditures “forms expected composition of military formation, their 
structure, plans of reformation of the AFU, calculates costs for their 
maintenance and carrying out reformation.”210 
(3) Formation of Proposals for the Budget of the MDU “defines financial 
resources for the development and reformation of the AFU according to codes 
of program classification of expenditures, creates proposals for budget requests 
of the MDU, and allocates defense expenditures subject to needs and defined 
priorities.”211 
                                                 
209 Shelest Y, “‘Resource’ – the Information-Analytical System for Support to the Defense Planning,” 





Figure 14.  Functional Structure of the IAS “Resource”212 
The core of the software complex is “accounting of defense resources” (Figure 
14). It is divided into two parts: the local version is a template for every military units, 
and a global version which contains the full functionality for analytical processing of 
information. This global version covers every branch of military units as can be viewed 
separately, under subordination, or in the entire AFU. This software also contains factual 
and normative indicators of resources, quantitative, qualitative, and cost indicators of 
resources. Accounting is carried out in an approved template of a military unit. This 
template is a summary statistical document which characterizes the condition of military 
units and its costs. 
                                                 
212 Ibid. p. 18. 
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Table 3.   Software Complexes of the IAS “Resource” 
Name of software complex Purpose 
Accounting for defense resources 
(Template) 
To input data about the condition and cost of 
military units 
Condition monitoring of defense resources 
(Monitoring) 
To view data about the actual and potential 
structure and composition of the AFU, their 
condition and maintenance costs 
Getting arbitrary reports (Free reports) 
For the formation of arbitrary information (reports) 
about the actual and potential structure and 
composition of the AFU, their condition and 
maintenance costs 
Obtaining regulatory reports (Regulatory 
reports) 
To generate and view regulated reports about actual 
and potential structure and composition of the AFU, 
their condition and maintenance costs 
Input of reference data and classifiers 
(Standards) 
To input reference data and classifiers 
Determining the cost of advanced military 
units (Advanced template) 
For creating and maintaining forms promising 
military units on a certain date 
The planning of measures for the 
reformation of the AFU and prediction of 
the AFU in the implementation of 
organizational measures to reform (Planning 
organizational activities) 
To determine the organizational measures for the 
reform of the AFU 
Assessment of the costs of carrying out the 
organizational measures on the reform of 
AFU (Cost of organizational measures) 
To calculate the cost of conducting organizational 
measures 
Information exchange (Interchange) 
For the organization of information exchange 
between objects the IAS “Resource” and with other 
systems 
Expert assessment of the state military 
formations (Expertise) 
For the evaluation of conducting of military units 
Database administrator To restrict access to database objects 
Proposals formation to the budget (Budget) To formulate proposals to the budget of the MDU 
Accounting for centralized expenditures 
(Centralized expenditures) 
To input data for centralized expenditures of 





In addition, the IAS “Resource” includes a number of software systems (Figure 
14) that can be used during the execution of organizational measures, modeling 
perspective the AFU. The most interesting is the software complex “expert assessment.” 
It “is intended for examination to determine the condition of military units.”213  
There are functions of that complex: “creation a domain model for peer review, 
formation of the list of evaluated alternatives, creation of an expert group, assessment of 
alternative model, performing calculations and processing of the results, formation 
reports of peer review.”214 However, since its creation, this software package has not 
been used by any department of the MDU or directorate of the GS. This software models 
different groupings of the AFU. It could be most popular in the Main Directorate of 
Operational Management of the GS, the Armament of the AFU, and the Logistics of the 
AFU, but these units prefer to use their own experience rather than work with software. 
Moreover, this software package never has been used to study alternatives and 
forecasting of using of groups of the AFU in performance of scenarios and during 
training exercises. This has led to the decline of this software and the processing of 
statistical reports in other software systems. Actually, the IAS “Resource” has the ability 
to replace and exclude most of the documents, namely accounting with financial 
accounting of logistical support of weapons and equipment. It was planned to do so, but 
unfortunately did not acquire practical importance not only in subdivisions of the GS, but 
in the MDDMP. Actually, experts believe it is better to get information from departments 
and divisions which are relevant to accounting than to apply for obtaining the report from 
the IAS “Resource.”  
B. THE CAUSES OF IAS “RESOURCE” FAILURE 
Thus, if the IAS “Resource” should be good software, why is it a failure? The 
Ukrainian army has taken significant steps in the development and implementation of the 
IAS “Resource.” Efforts made have provided some momentum for its use. At the same 
time, due to insufficient funding and distrust of electronic accounting systems, these 
                                                 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid., 21. 
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efforts have lost momentum since 2010. For certain political and military-political 
conditions, the MDU and the GS began to abandon opportunities presented by IAS 
“Resource.” This was facilitated by many causes, chiefly personnel reduction and large 
and significant errors in accounting. The creation of the IAS “Resource” was done under 
the leadership of Shelest. When he left the position of the Chief of the Main Directorate 
of Defense Planning of the GS, continued use of the IAS “Resource” became 
questionable. 
The next cause is a consequence of the first one—personnel reductions. Starting 
in 2010, the decline in defense planning began. The reasons for that issue was as follows: 
continuous change in political course, mindless reform (reduce the regular positions in 
military units), changing leadership of the AFU, the arrival of experts who did not value 
defense planning and opposed transparency in the reporting and planning indicators.  
Currently, such an attitude has led to a chaotic support of military units due to 
lack of planning. The inability to organize logistical support shows in the area of the 
ATO. Today, only volunteers can make troops be able to perform tasks as directed. But 
volunteers can provide military clothing, first aid, food, and organization of everyday life 
but cannot provide fuel, equipment, and ammunition. There is a huge gap in national 
defense due to unappropriated planning and execution of responsibility from the 
leadership side of the GS and the MDU. 
Since 2009, force management officers in military units who worked with the IAS 
“Resource” were dismissed on grounds of redundancy. Moreover, the number of 
personnel in the IPCDP was reduced and its full elimination was planned by 2014. 
Fortunately, the IPCDP still exists due to current situation in Ukraine. However, the 
IPCDP exists only to maintain the IAS “Resource” in working condition. Thereby, the 
second direction of the IPCDP could not work appropriately, because there are no experts 
with considerable knowledge. The IPCDP has some personnel who can work on 
computers and can maintain only the processing server of the IPCDP in working 
condition. For those still remaining in some military units, the PC station of the IAS 
“Resource” has no experts to establish and restore (update) database and software. 
Personnel for work with the IAS “Resource” were trained in The Training Center in 
 87
Nikolaev, but since 2010 the number of those specialists has gradually been reduced, and 
in 2013 this Center was eliminated. Currently, such specialists receive no training. Thus, 
in three to five years almost all specialists will disappear.  
Therefore, over time (2011–2013), in connection with the reduction specialists of 
force management in military units (reduction or attract to perform different [not duty] 
tasks and functions) input data to the IAS “Resource” has become completely flawed, 
especially in the identification capabilities, accounting of weapons, and military 
equipment. Consequently, almost all decisions were created in the directorates of the GS 
by manual method. Thus, the second direction of the IPCDP operation started to receive 
inaccurate and inconsistent information. Reports from the IPCDP and referenced data 
have had significant deviations, and thus those reports are being declined. First, it is a 
distrust of preparing a template of a military unit. Because the most specialists of force 
management in military units have been reduced, the form is filled out by unauthorized 
and unqualified officers who make sometimes critical mistakes.  
Next, the IAS “Resource” is untruthful because when an error is detected, it is 
better to correct the error by management than in some software. At the same time, the 
IAS “Resource” performs other calculations and produces analytical reports, which 
unfortunately remain only on paper. The most requested forms are the financial 
indicators, but they are produced with the assistance of the financial divisions of the 
MDU and the GS for the reasons previously stated. That is why currently the IAS 
“Resource” is more like a system that only deals with statistical information that is barely 
used.  
Finally, the most painful cause of failure is the complex legislation needed to 
maintain the confidentiality of information in the AFU. This contributed to the training 
personnel from the Soviet Union and a bureaucratic system designed to protect 
information that has not been updated since 1995–1997. When the IAS “Resource” was 
first implemented, Shelest created conditions and developed the documentation to fully 
display this system. Thus, it was envisaged that the IAS “Resource” should work in an 
open network (the Internet) and a closed network. Unfortunately, Shelest’s idea was not 
realized. Thus, initially in the MDU there were put into operation the Intranet “Dnipro” 
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(partially open network), the “Karpaty” (closed network), and as a backup channel,  
satellite communication.. At that time, the closed channels of communication began to 
develop from the company unit to GS with servers in the operational commands. But, 
Shelest’s retirement due to cost reductions and policy revisions, these developments were 
forgotten. For instance, the attempt to deploy a fiber optic network of local connections in 
one office between three PC resources is almost impossible through the regulations of the 
State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection of Ukraine. To 
create a fiber optical local area network amongst three PCs to commission the IAS 
“Resource,” it is required a hundred requests, and more than thirty permits for accounting 
and processing of the “Template of a military unit” from the various instances. This has 
created another problem: the accumulation of contradictory instructions, laws, 
regulations, directives, and different kinds of methods does not allow users to take 
initiative on the spot, and eliminates the possibility of carrying out independent decision-
making and actions.  
C. QUESTION ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE IAS “RESOURCE” 
The issue about the continuing existence of the IAS “Resource” is questionable. 
This system was created for defense planning support, but in spite of the correct initial 
use, the development of the IAS “Resource” went in the wrong direction. The system was 
transformed into an accounting database able to analyze the readiness of single units. 
However, today the system (Figure 15) does not work properly due to the previously 




Figure 15.  Existing Scheme of Working IAS “Resource” 
First, the IAS “Resource” should be upgraded. It will be costly and take a long 
time. The following changes are necessary for restoring the performance capabilities of 
the IAS “Resource.” 
(1) First, the MDU should give tasks to a research institute working on the 
development and commissioning of the unified IAS of defense planning support on the 
basis of the IAS “Resource,” but more advanced, and which can be connected to almost 
all the IASs or their shares and be given to databases in the same format which can use 
other military formation for their IASs. However, for a successful performance, the 
research institute must have a clear and detailed description of the technology 
requirements of the unified IAS from the MDU, the GS, and services of the AFU. 
Otherwise, a private research institute or a private firm should develop what the military 
might actually need. This unified UIAS should contain a database for couple of levels of 
access (see Appendix C): 
(a) Level to battalion: general data; the possibility of a military unit for 
performing tasks on situations of using the AFU; unit tasks and capabilities in accordance 
with the situations of its using; the scheme of organization of military units in the state of 
wartime and peacetime; number of personnel on the staff of wartime and peacetime, the 
actual staffing; number of main armament and military equipment by state wartime and 
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peacetime, the actual staffing; tasks that units must perform to ensure readiness to 
perform tasks on situations of their using. In this level commanders of the system will 
help the commander to make necessary decisions. 
(b) Level to brigade: besides Level 1; territorial divisions and information about 
the capability of local enterprises and authorities; availability of mobilization resource 
and transport; interaction with other security agencies and their operational objectives in 
their territory.  
(c) Level the MDU and the GS: organization of civil protection, territorial 
defense, census of population and transport, the ability of other agencies; availability of 
resources of the state defense-industrial complex, the procedures for their use; the ability 
to obtain information about the existence of any resources, and strategic objectives of 
agencies; defense and budget planning, adjustment of defense expenditures, execution 
control of financing and program implementation. 
(d) Level of the CMU, the NSDCU: report of information and analysis about the 
challenges and threats of the state (just for general analysis). 
Thus, having such level-based the unified IAS makes it possible to have all the 
required parameters and data at the appropriate levels; to quickly obtain the necessary 
information and to have a single register and record of all logistical resources and 
population. This software package should be able to view the model of threat situations. 
(2) The following points are a provided proposal for the unified IAS for analysis 
and maintaining of information, its processing and analysis, and providing a database: all 
subsystems should operate both in the general interface and the separate international 
standards ISO 12207 and ISO 9000–3 should be on hold; database in shared tables and 
the possibility of getting arbitrary reference with distribution and delimitation access 
rights according to official positions; using of common and international guides and 
translators; exchange of information between subsystems on the basis of a single 
document circulation that will identify the layers of the structure and to determine who 
can enter the system (this can distribute to layers level from the company to the highest 
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with limited or complete access. This is the layer systems and subsystems that will 
provide input processing and analysis of information). 
(3) Next, to build a unified IAS. It must be reproduced on four levels: (a) 
executive level—it exists, but without enough frequency for efficiency, and it is required 
the certain number of personnel in military units; (b) level link-local objects—it is absent 
because of some legal regulations which prohibit the use of specified database in the local 
network and Internet resources; (c) level of information-analytical support in accordance 
with interlayer interaction between agencies—this is for unified work in a single system 
and form; (d) inter-level communication—it is complete absent (approval of documents 
and receiving arbitrary references is possible only with official request for information 
would within ten to twenty days). Thus, the unified IAS would make the Timecard 
Urgent Reports215 obsolete and give all necessary information through its own 
subsystems. This is possible only if several conditions previously described will occur 
and increase the unified IAS experts in military units, fully implement the unified IAS, 
and create the local exchange network information obligations with frequency changes in 
the database (financial services, defense planning, and logistics experts). 
(4). Ensuring the accuracy of the information: input and output. A necessary 
condition for ensuring the accuracy of the information is the unconditional observance of 
the principle of a single input (but within a constant period—through the required 
frequency) and reused information. With the accounting implementation into the AFU, 
basic work with the primary accounting of the defense resources of all types (assets, 
property, arms, ammunition, equipment, finance, and personnel) is practically 
concentrated in financial sections of military. The issues of automation of the processes 
of formation of arrays of information in respect of financial, material and other resources 
are not well developed both in theory and in practice.  
Therefore, further studies should be conducted from the perspective  of unifying 
all the IASs into a single database: accounting for personnel qualified for military service, 
an accounting system for transport of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, 
                                                 
215 This is classified list of forms and time schedules for urgent reports within the MDU, the GS and 
the AFU that approved by order of Ministry of Defense. 
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accounting for the availability and capability of the defense-industrial complex. Thus, 
such a system would allow full automation and a closed loop operation of most 
departments and directorates. Further, it is possible to connect strategic system 
assessment and forecasting and to provide full access to an information crisis center or a 
center of military command and control forces. 
Thus, this upgraded IAS “Resource” would avoid significant workflow, reduce 
the volume of paperwork and routine reports (by about 80%216), eliminate false data from 
different data sources, reduce reporting of information online (a weekly upgrade), 
provide interoperability with other agencies, give a full picture of the real and the actual 
posture in the state economy and in the defense-industrial complex, and provide an 
opportunity for continuous and fruitful work by state authorities. However, it should be 
noted that in the first years, no significant effect would be felt because of the necessity (at 
least five to seven years): (1) to teach the personnel (with the experience of foreign 
experts of the NATO countries); (2) to develop and hire staff and to hire military 
specialists of force management; (3) to develop technical protocol for information 
security, and so on; (4) to exclude strictly and comprehensively the cases and attempts of 
chiefs of departments or directorates the WDU and the GS to operate under the obsolete 
standards; (5) to process the majority of normative and legislative acts, including 
guidelines of service of information assurance, which are currently unclear, and 
sometimes unacceptable and make impossible to perform most of the activities. Of 
course, this requires the appropriate resource and the assistance of foreign specialists. 
Thus, upgrading the IAS “Resource” needs tremendous investment, personnel, 
and time, but unfortunately the previously mentioned changes do not help to improve the 
decision-making process in the MDU and the GS. However, it will be a perfect 
accounting system for any resources that can create prospective schemes of unit structure 
or strength of personnel (according to category and specialization). 
                                                 
216 Nowadays, in MDU, GS, and AFU all routine reports are created and submitted according to the 
Table of Routine Report (classified, approved by the Order of Minister of Defense) legacy of the Soviet 
Union Army. 
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The second step is more difficult because it will involve political decisions, but 
could be less costly. Moreover, it could help to move from Eastern norms to Western 
ones in force management, to support the decision-making process as initially planned, 
and money spent will not become a sunk cost. Thus, the following changes are necessary. 
(1) The most difficult political decision is to replace officers in the GS and the 
MDU by appointing people who can and actually want to work. If they have foreign 
education, they can think “outside of the box” and act with initiative and creativity. 
However, it does not mean discharging all personnel at once, but starting to turn in a 
critical direction that needs to be reflected in defense and budget planning, acquisition, 
and personnel distribution. 
(2) As soon as possible, completely change military legislation to move away 
from the Soviet Union legacy of complete centralization. The purpose is to give 
responsibilities to commanders: to provide more rights and opportunities, to allow 
commanders to make their own decisions about training and how they deliver 
capabilities, unit support, etc. However, it is first necessary to make a full audit of units 
(to eliminate surplus materials and excess reserves) and to set boundaries and limit 
expenditures on fuel and ammunition while conducting exercises (to avoid corruption and 
the feeling of permissiveness). In the follow up, the commanders will have full 
responsibility, but preliminary action will show who can manage it. 
(3) The most painful issue is budgeting. It is important to give responsibility to 
senior commanders to manage their forces’ budget. This plays a key role in capability of 
units and the decision-making process as well. Money is everything. However, it should 
begin gradually with educational support to select officials. For instance: (1) to designate 
two to three battalion and one to two brigades structures in every services; (2) to task the 
Department of Finance of the MDU to create a one-month education course in every 
service Academy (including the National Defense University of Ukraine) for 
commanders, and to make such a course obligatory in the education system of cadets; (3) 
by the end of the budget year to train commanders of defined battalions and brigades; (4) 
for the next year to allocate a budget for them and monitor their management. During real 
practice it is possible to define who is able to make budget decisions; (5) to expand the 
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number of units and thus to give commanders full responsibility and initiative in 
decision-making. In this case the audit units (with completely replacement personnel) 
will provide a real audit of a unit’s activity, but not an old type of inspection. The GS and 
the MDU will be occupied in their actual task: management of the AFU on operational-
strategic level and policy-making accordingly. 
(4) The software “Ruslo” should replace “Parus”217 in financial accounting first 
of all in the defined units previously shown. At the same time, using this software should 
be in the curriculum of financial officers and introduced for commanders. 
(5) The Report of the State Secret Information and the legislation on this issue 
should be reviewed and reissued. Once more, to get away from the Soviet Union heritage, 
more information needs to be freely available. Thus, it is necessary to provide more 
transparency and freedom to work with the PC.  
(6) Digital signatures should be implemented as soon as possible to replace 
needless paperwork. 
(7) The IAS “Resource” should be retained in its existing condition. However, for 
it to be developed, it is necessary to give tasks to the Departments and Directorates of the 
MDU and the GS and commanders of units of the AFU to develop a set of requirements 
for subsystems. It should not be unreal or virtual and contain real outcomes: what 
information or report the subsystem should provide, and how it helps to make certain 
decisions. 
Thus, the main and the difficult issue of the second step is its replacement. This is 
first of all a political decision. However, the best way to build something new  is to 
completely abandon the old basis, even if it was once good and stable. Otherwise, it is a 
reconstruction: the color and the shape could be different, but the core is the same. The 
most appropriate, painless, economical, and efficient way in Ukraine is to gradually build 
new military units with new awareness, and little-by-little to replace all old units. 
                                                 
217 “Parus” is a financial accounting software that the Department of Finance of the MDU is using 
now. 
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Regarding the MDU and the GD, it is necessary to sharply depart from the Soviet Union 
legacy. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The IAS “Resource” was initially created for defense planning support, but 
actually it is for force management and unfortunately cannot support decision-making 
process in its current form.  
This chapter explains the IAS “Resource,” shows the causes of its failure, and 
proposes its use further. However, without understanding what tasks the IAS “Resource” 
should execute, it makes little sense to upgrade this software. The IAS “Resource” should 
exist as a tool for force management, but in which conditions: for resource and budget 
accounting or for decision-making support? The decision of weighing costs and timelines 
should be made by high military authority. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONDUCTING DEFENSE 
PLANNING IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE. 
From the previous chapters, for effectively conducting defense planning and 
avoiding future mistakes, changes must be made in this sphere as soon as possible. In 
addition, the MDU and the GS needed to be reorganized. Military authorities agreed with 
this need and at the beginning of 2015 announced a number of personnel changes. 
Unfortunately, promotions will be made without adequate valuation of skills and 
experience, but in the presence of ATO experience. Such policy is absolutely correct in 
the case of commanders at different levels, but it should be carefully evaluated for other 
specific positions. 
This chapter provides some key recommendations for conducting and supporting 
defense planning in the MDU and the GS: (1) the need to eliminate Soviet legal concepts 
through the abolition of the Military Doctrine, (2) conducting the DR based on the 
Western practice, (3) human resource and institution changes through decentralization, 
(4) restructuring the defense program. 
A. LEGISLATION SHOULD SUPPORT TO CONDUCTING DEFENSE 
PLANNING 
Ukrainian legislation concerning the defense sphere needs many changes, but not 
because of defense planning. It was created in a hurry after Ukraine’s independence and 
has received many amendments (such amendments were unfortunately not an 
improvement, but contained some useful necessities) Therefore, due to the current 
situation in Ukraine, it is reasonable to make some amendments. The MDU and the GS 
should work together to replace the Eastern pattern with the Western one (Table 1). 
The first step is that the Military Doctrine of Ukraine218 needs to be replaced. It is 
a failed legacy of Soviet time. Moreover, this is the basis for almost all documents of 
defense planning on all its stages. It could be a Strategic Defense Guidance that replaced 
                                                 
218 President of Ukraine. Decree of June 15, 2004, № 648/2004, About Military Doctrine of Ukraine 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/648/2004. 
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the Military Doctrine. However, it should not be government work, but created from the 
bottom-up by involving the AFU. This guidance should have clear priorities, tasks, and 
capabilities that the AFU needs to fulfill. It is important to clearly and directly define 
conditions of application and capabilities of the AFU for defense during aggression, 
participation in the operations in its territory, and conditions of application of the military 
organization. As required, the DR should provide necessary changes to this guidance. 
The final and significant issue is linking the Military Doctrine with resources. The 
Strategic Defense Guidance should not have slogans, but should provide real priorities 
according to available resources. 
The current project of the National Defense Strategy219 was represented as a base 
for a new Military Doctrine and, without changes in legislation, will beget a new pile of 
different programs and plans. The former Soviet Union system where one plan creates 
another, and another, and a set of plans at the tactical level still exists. The project of the 
National Defense Strategy includes the next important issues: (1) outside (Russia) and 
inside (ineffective national security support system, corruption, economic and financial 
crisis, and so on) threats; (2) NATO membership; (3) new direction in partnership (the 
USA and Europe); (4) armament of the AFU and renewal of the rocket shield; 
(5)widespread corruption; (6) energy security. In addition, the issue about nuclear 
weapons was arisen,220 but decisions are still unclear. The National Defense Strategy 
remains until 2020. However, the biggest weakness is that the National Defense Strategy 
states that the level of state funding of security and defense sector should not be less than 
5% of the GDP. The bad experience of defense funding (Figures 6 and 10) that was 
actually approved was not less than 3% of the GDP,221 but such percentage of the GDP 
had never happened until recent events in Ukraine. The challenge here is to create a 
project with available resources. It is possible to assume that this strategy will be a failure 
                                                 
219 “Key points of the draft of the new National Security Strategy,” on April 22, 2015, Bleak Sea 
News, http://www.blackseanews.net/read/97987. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Law of December 6, 1991, no. 1932-XII, About the Defense of 
Ukraine. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1932-12. 
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as well because it is based on the Eastern pattern of the Military Doctrine, which is 
focused on the process, not the results. 
Next, the law About the Organization of Defense Planning222 should be remade or 
even canceled. Besides, this law for all agencies in defense planning exists in just the 
AFU. Thus, this law could be replaced by Guidance of Defense planning, which has to 
define responsibility for implementing regulatory documents of defense planning and 
terms of their execution. 
The MDU infrastructure (i.e., warehouses, arsenals, bases of the ammunition 
storage) should be transferred to the Department of Economic Activity of the MDU, be 
taken from the AFU, and entered as a separate structure. Also, units of Housing 
provisions should be taken out and made part of a non-military structure. Conditions 
should be provided for the signing of contracts with companies (for outsourcing as well) 
both in peacetime and during combat missions. But first, there is necessity to perform 
financial and technical audit of the defense industry, their capabilities and the need to 
restructure, to evaluate the real potential of the industry, and to define its structure (a list 
of enterprises subject to assistance or liquidation, leaving the state sector or privatized). 
However, it is necessary to take into account the prospects for participation of enterprises 
in addressing the needs within the real volume of defense contracts as well as human 
resources and the social protection of personnel freed.  
For defense budget transparency every year in the last decade of budget approval, 
the following issues have been included in the parliamentary hearings: assessment of the 
condition and effectiveness of the all security sector agencies; prospects of proposed 
defense development programs for next year, and the needs of the military organization 
for the next year. 
In addition, there are different kinds of middle- or long-term target or state 
defense programs that were developed by the MDU and the GS and approved by the 
government. They are repetitive and barely executed because of overly ambitious plans, a 
                                                 
222 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Law of November 18, 2004, № 2198-IV, article 9, About the 
Organization of Defense Planning. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2198-15. 
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lot of bureaucracy, the absence of force management, understanding of efficient resource 
allocation, and transparency. For instance, the National program of building military 
carrier An-70223 was approved for 2004–2022 and included in the State Program of the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006–2011,224 and The State Complex Program of 
Reformation and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Until 2017,225 but the 
information about the execution during this period is missing. Twenty years of failure in 
executing these programs shows that the MDU and the GS must eliminate all legacy 
planning documents. The MDU and the GS have to work on programs that they need to 
fulfill the AFU’s tasks and capabilities, and demonstrate the need for a budget. Finally, 
the MDU and the GS have to apply their efforts to shift from an Eastern pattern to a 
Western one through purging Soviet concepts, documents, and, most important—
thinking. 
B. PRIORITIES IN CONDUCTION OF DEFENSE REVIEW 
On the basis of the current situation in Ukraine, a comprehensive review of the 
security sector should be conducted during 2015 and a new National Security Strategy 
should be developed based on it, not the Military Doctrine. Also, it is necessary to 
establish a three-year comprehensive review cycle of the state of the national security 
system and its components, and develop and adjust middle-term development programs. 
For effectiveness and transparency of the DR, international experts and non-government 
agencies should be involved. 
The DR should provide link defense strategy to the armed forces and resources. 
Resources are sometimes limited to money and personnel, but actually encompasses all 
                                                 
223 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Law of February 5, 2004, №1462-IV, About the National Program of 
Building Military Carrier An-70 and it Procurements Under the State Defense Request, 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1462-15. 
224 President of Ukraine, Decree of December 27, 2005, № 1862–25/2005 (restricted) About Decision 
of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on December 9, 2005 “About the State Program 
of Development the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006–2011.” 
225 President of Ukraine, Decree of September 2, 2013, № 479/2013, About Decision of the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on September 2, 2013 “About The State Complex Program of 
Reformation and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Until 2017.” 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/479/2013. 
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of these: money, personnel, materials, infrastructure, armament and military equipment, 
etc. “Ideally, the government’s strategic objectives are matched to capabilities and 
resources to entire change or maintain those capabilities.”226 The workgroup from the 
conference on the Center for Strategic and International Studies227 discussed primary 
phases, steps, and useful questions for conducting the SDR. Thus, there are three phases 
of the SDR228: (1) strategic assessment, (2) policy development, (3) decisions and 
implementation. There can be seven steps in each phase:229 (1) preparation, (2) review of 
the security environment —setting the national policy framework, (3) establishing a 
planning assumption, (4) defining military tasks, (5) developing force structure options, 
(6) making decisions, and (7) announcements and implementation. 
In the first phase, the DR observes defense planning from the standpoint of 
national strategy: security and foreign policy. From the national interests, the strategic 
direction, future defense policy, and a variety of scenarios are defined. The result of this 
assessment is a set of military tasks and missions that need to be accomplished, and then 
activities, capabilities, and resources that need to be undertaken to support those tasks. 
The second phase includes an examination of internal and external politics, mostly in 
different kinds of financial and social issues. The third phase would review force 
structure options. This is the most important phase, because these options should meet the 
requirements of the armed forces with available resources. The most difficult decision-
making process is how to put together availability of funding, personnel, and analytic 
tools to accomplish defined tasks. The workgroup230 gathered best practices for the 
analysis of force structure options: (1) take a resource-informed view; (2) look at defense 
planning in a large national context; (3) make assumptions explicit; (4) make a list of 
priority missions, with levels of capabilities; (5) focus on training, life cycle cost, and 
                                                 
226 Jennifer M. Taylor, Emily Boggs, Strategic Defense Reviews: Procedures, Frameworks, and Tools 
to Enhance Future Defense Institution Building Project (ISBN 978–0-89206-670-4) (Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2011), 3 
http://csis.org/files/publication/110930_Taylor_StratDefRev_WEB.pdf. 
227 Ibid., 8. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid., 9. 
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other nonmaterial solutions; (6) follow through on conducting annual updates to track 
initiatives in the planning document. Finally, when all information is in decision-makers’ 
hands and decisions are made, the final stage of the last phase can begin—implement the 
annual assessment and adjust as required.  
Should the DR be periodic? To begin with, the legal foundation of the DR in the 
UK was not regularly conducted until 2010, when a five-year cycle DR was mandated. 
Since 1995, a DR has been conducted every four years in the USA. This process depends 
on the ability of the state to manage and support it, because the DR can be a labor 
intensive process. It is important to have a willingness of political authority to do it 
properly and experienced experts who can think outside the box, be transparent, and be 
sources of reliable information. Jennifer M. Taylor argues that “[l]ack of capable and 
experienced strategic thinkers, lack of a robust planning culture, inadequate data 
collection, and domestic politics can all undermine good intentions of defense leaders 
looking to complete a useful review.”231 However, a periodic DR has the risk of turning 
into routine work without effective results, whereas a DR on demand a priori can provide 
some new developments. In addition, it would be reasonable to provide the practice of the 
United States to conduct defense reviews not just in the defense sphere, but also 
separately by the service of the AFU (Army, Navy, and Air Force), defense industry/
acquisitions, personnel. 
C. CHALLENGE OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND INSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURE CHANGES 
The current situation shows the willingness of the president, the majority of 
members of the VRU and the volunteer movement to build a strong, capable army. 
Unfortunately, the personnel in key positions in the MDU and the GS remain the same. 
Moreover, the education system is a legacy from the Soviet Union. If the basis for 
education on the tactical level is rather effective, the next two levels—operation-tactical 
and operation-strategic—are long-term and useless for professional and skill 
improvement. It is not an issue for this work, but it is necessary to completely change the 
                                                 
231 Ibid., 3. 
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educational system for these two levels: it should be from one to two weeks of courses 
for two to three months, depending on the complexity of the training. 
Thereby, the MDU and the GS need cardinal changes: completely change all 
personnel, especially in key positions. Due to the war in Ukraine, it is necessary to 
carefully choose the officers and civilian personnel for every position. People should be 
open-minded, be ready to learn quickly, and work for the country but not themselves. The 
important point is that officers or civilians should be ready to make decisions. In this 
case, responsibility should be defined very carefully but clearly. 
Relative to defense planning, the general management of defense planning should 
reside with a deputy chief of the GS. In this case, conducting of defense planning will not 
be just a gathering of information and creating the TPMD and PMD, but this deputy chief 
has to be able to make decisions about necessary changes in plans and projects. Thus, this 
person would have responsibility for consequences and results. 
The Directorate of Defense Planning should be separated from the MDDMP 
(separate defense planning from mobilization). The sections of this new Directorate 
should be divided according to the Main Forces Programs that is discussed in the next 
part of this chapter. Each section should have a separate program manager with the 
responsibility to create, monitor, and support projects from the beginning to the end. This 
section should be responsible for submitting proposals about execution of the program 
and analyzing the risk of underfunding. Currently, the Department of Finance of the 
MDU actually makes changes in budget expenditures, and just after that changes have 
accumulated quarterly, then they go to the PMD. This practice creates a complete mess 
by the end of the year. Thus, this decision about changes, reductions, or the cancelation 
of projects within the program should be suggested by a responsible sector from the 
Directorate of Defense Planning. The deputy chief of the GS has to make a final decision, 
but in individual cases, some issues can be reported to the Chief of GS and the Minister 
of Defense of Ukraine. In addition, one sector should be responsible for procurement 
process to manage procurement cases across programs. 
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Moreover, to create the PMD, special working groups should be formed 
according to the clusters of the PMD. Its composition, besides specialists from 
operational, logistic, financial, personnel and other sectors, should include specialists 
from the services of the AFU. The Commanders of the services of the AFU should have 
responsibility and make a decision on how they need to be formed and train subordinated 
units. 
To avoid confusion with the responsibility now, reform could begin as a pilot-
project in the Navy of the AFU. It might be the easiest way to re-build the Navy which 
was barely destroyed after Crimea’s annexation. Moreover, many navy officers have 
education and international training abroad. Thus, this pilot project would give the Navy 
Commander the financial and planning responsibility to build capability and fulfill given 
tasks that will demonstrate how the Navy Commander can make efficient and effective 
resource management and defense planning. It should help to make a more rational use of 
personnel and reduce the time needed for the preparation of justification and decision-
making. Also it helps to simplify and make the formation and execution of the budget 
more transparent. Moreover, the Navy Commander will know about units’ capability, 
their costs, resources allocation, and will be responsible for the units’ ability to fulfill the 
given tasks. Making changes within every service and inside the MDU and the GS would 
link defense planning with financial resources, operational plans, and a more effective 
decision-making process. 
Finally, volunteer movements in the AFU should be discussed. The Ukrainian 
army failed to prove necessary logistical support and volunteers have been helping 
soldiers in the ATO to survive. Thus, the MDU and the GS should employ volunteers’ 
help without creating bureaucratic obstacles. On behalf of the MDU and the GS 
volunteers should be kept on necessary positions and replaced specialists who is unable 
to fulfill the tasks. 
D. RESTRUCTURING OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS 
Chapter I briefly describes existing defense programs. The structure of a budget 
program is a government standard, so it is almost impossible to change it in the MDU, let 
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alone others’ state agencies. Thus, the defense programs have been changed since their 
development. These programs have always been adjusted under budget programs for 
convenient transformation. However, the defense programs (clusters [subclusters]) need 
to be changed. This section proposes changes in the defense program structure (clusters 
[subclusters]) and implementing project integrity. 
1. Defense Program Structure 
Due to the necessity to have transparent cost information, it is reasonable to 
organize the structure of the defense program based on Future Years Defense Program 
Structure232 of the DOD (Figure 16): 
 
Figure 16.  Future Years Defense Program Structure of DOD 
The first step is DOD appropriations. The structure of DOD appropriations is 
almost identical to the MDU defense programs, but not budget programs—an analogue of 
appropriations. Unfortunately, the budget planning system in Ukraine is common to all 
                                                 
232 Lisa Potvin, “Practical Financial Management: A Handbook for the Defense Department Financial 
Management,” (Naval Postgraduate School, November 2011, 11th Edition), 65. 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Schools/GSBPP/docs/PCC/FMGuide.pdf. 
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state agencies. Every agency manager has budget expenditures and a list of certain budget 
programs, some of which are mandated in the following categories: authority 
administration, medicine, and education. The difficulty is that all these programs repeat 
the same expenditures which complicates transparency and understanding of the 
expenditures. Besides, budget programs, except the basic ones, can change from year to 
year. Since, it is impossible to change budget planning system only in the MDU (without 
involving other agencies), and in regard to the simple transformation of defense program 
to budget, it is reasonable to put on this side the clusters (subclusters) of the PMD. 
However, these clusters need some changes.  
Thus, the proposal of the list of new clusters (subclusters) is similar with NATO 
allocation: (1) Personnel Cost, (2) Operational and Maintenance Cost, (3) Procurement, 
(4) Construction, (5) R&D, (6) Other Expenditures. 
1. Personnel cost  
a. Military personnel 
i. Payment and allowances 
ii. Employer’s contribution to retirement and social funds 
iii. Other (uniform, food, travelling cost, medical insurance, etc.) 
b. Civilian personnel 
i. Payment and allowances 
ii. Employer’s contribution to retirement and social funds 
2. Operations and maintenance cost 
i. Ammunition and explosive 
ii. Petroleum products 
iii. Spare parts (cost concerning current repairs in the military 
units) 





vi. Other operations and maintenance 
3. Procurement 
a. Missile system 
b. Missiles (conventional weapons) 
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c. Nuclear weapon233 
d. Aircraft and support system 
e. Artillery 
f. Combat vehicles 
g. Engineering equipment 
h. Weapons and small arms 
i. Transport vehicles 
j. Ships, harbor craft, and support system 
k. Electronic and communications equipment 
4. Construction 










6. Other expenditures 
The next step is components. There is almost no difference between these forces: 
Army, Navy, Air Force, the MDU and the GS, and other military units. Creating Special 
Operation Forces is still discussed in the MDU and the GS.234 If it were created, the new 
component would be added. Components of the MDU and the GS should not include 
support units and units of the central subordinate. However, for successful 
implementation, it is necessary to give budget responsibility to branches; otherwise this 
structure is useless, because the allocation of expenditure remains unchanged. Moreover, 
cost definitions will never be corrected without the services taking greater responsibility. 
Although it may be impossible to change everything at once, it is reasonable to change it 
gradually, starting with the Navy. The Navy would be a good start because of Ukraine’s 
current situation: it should be created from the base when it is relatively not so large and 
                                                 
233 It is necessary if the decision about nuclear weapon in Ukraine is made. 
234 “The Special Operation Forces will be created in Ukraine,” on April 20, 2015, Korrespondent.net, 
http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3505708-v-ukrayne-sozdadut-syly-spetsyalnykh-operatsyi. 
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complex. Thus, it is possible to do it as a pilot project creating sections of defense 
planning and financial management. 
Finally, the third component is the Major Force Programs. Initially the GS tried 
attempt to create it, but because of the complexity of resource allocation and management 
approach this attempt was denied. Thus, the Major Force Programs could include the 
following: 
(1) The Immediate Response Force (projects for organization and associated 
procurement of weapon systems, training for military units of highly mobile airborne 
troops, naval infantry, military unit intelligence, and a special purpose brigade of ships).  
(2) The Rapid Reaction Force (projects for the procurement of weapon systems, 
training for mechanized, artillery, (rocket artillery) and missile brigades (regiments), 
aviation and anti-aircraft missile units). 
(3) The Reserve Forces (projects for units for training personnel for increasing 
forces of constant readiness and deployment of parts of the territorial defense in the event 
of a threat of armed aggression). 
(4) Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence (projects for 
communication, security, intelligence, and function of mapping, weather service, cyber 
control and security, and so on). 
(5) Research and Development (projects and activities that have not been 
approved for operational use yet). 
(6) Supply and Maintenance (resources for support units, storehouses and depots 
that related to supply, maintenance, and service activities). 
(7) Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities (resources for 
personnel: education, training, duty travelling, food and uniform, health care, family 
housing and so on). 
(8) Administrative Activities (resources for the administrative support of the 
MDU and the GS). 
Figure 17 covers the Annual Defense Program Structure. 
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Figure 17.  Annual Defense Program Structure 
2. Project Integrity 
For each separate project (for instance, the creation or purchase of a new sample 
of AME) the decision-making process must take integrity into account. Every project has 
to contain not only direct costs but also incidental costs such as personnel, training, 
infrastructure, utilization (use from the beginning to the disposal) etc. Figure 18 provides 
the scheme of the decision-making process for separate projects. For instance, creation of 
multifunctional complex P1 that is to be purchased in in the second year the project: not 
just investment costs should be considered, but also other associated costs. Of course, it is 
a resource that transformed into a cost, and not just for a general sum, but by year and 
allocation. Thus, project P1 in the first year needs allocated investment cost and 
infrastructure costs. In the second year, besides the first year costs, maintenance and 
personnel training costs are incurred. Assuming that the last purchase is in the second 
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year, the next couple of years cover maintenance and personnel training costs only. 
Finally, the estimated final utilization costs must not be eliminated. Thereby, the project 
will cover all areas that will affect not only the creation or procurement, but also its 
continuous support through the end of the life cycle. 
 
Figure 18.  Transparent View of Project Cost Relevant for Making Decision 
E. CONCLUSION 
The main factors needed for the successful development of professional armed 
forces of Ukraine are as follows: the political will to eradicate corruption; the effective 
management of all sectors of defense and security; well-defined personal liability and 
responsibility at all levels; continuous analytical support of the development and 
implementation of programs and plans, timely adjustments and proper financial support. 
However, without managers’ willingness to make necessary changes, any planned future 
activities and current gains will fail. 
The MDU and the GS need be completely changed as institutions and with 
personnel as well. Legislation, strategic documents, plans, and projects should be simple, 
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clear, and transparent. Funding of the AFU should be transparent as well to avoid 
corruption, especially in procurement.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Intensified integration of Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic, the military operations 
conducted in the South-East region of the state, and immediate defense reforms are 
among top state priorities. The planning stage of the development of the armed forces and 
the defense and security sector forms the basis for future reforms in other spheres of 
public administration and economic development of Ukraine. The creation of the modern 
AFU should go along with the development of defense planning system. The MDU and 
the GS should be able to recognize their mistakes and not repeat them in the future. It is 
time to turn away from the Eastern pattern and take the Western one.  
Defense planning is a political and military process that States use to determine 
the necessary requirements of its defense obligations. But the system of defense planning 
must meet not only today’s requirements of the state, but also be able to provide for the 
future. Unfortunately, over the years, the defense planning system failed to reach a 
common understanding on this issue; there are many contradictions and conflicts both in 
the political and economic components. 
A. SUMMARY AND STRUCTURE OF WORK 
The purposes of this research were to outline the outstanding aspects of the 
general problems of an existing defense planning system and define the basic ways to 
overcome them; to analyze conducting the DR and define its pitfalls; to describe 
necessary changes to the existing legislative framework of defense planning and 
corresponding changes in military institutions; to analyze defense programs and suggest 
restructuring for project creation; and to revive the IAS “Resource” and discuss its 
necessity for further development. 
This work fulfilled these tasks by  
1. Systematizing the factors that determine the aspects of problems of 
conducting defense planning and establishing changes in the MDU, the 
GS, and the AFU, and proposing defense legislation and institutional 
changes. 
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2. Analyzing the process of the DR in Ukraine, the weaknesses of 
Recommendations for the MDU about the organization and conduct of the 
DR, and defining the main pitfalls, based on the Western practice of the 
DR. 
3. Analyzing the interdependence of budget and defense programs, making 
recommendations about restructuring defense program, and 
recommending an approach for project creation. 
4. Projecting the evolution of the IAS “Resource” and defining 
recommendation for its further development. 
The first chapter states the main purposes and importance of the work; defines 
tasks, objects, and subjects of research and the problems and methodology addressed 
here, and provides a literature review related to defense planning. 
The second chapter provides evolution of all levels of defense planning: long, 
middle, and short. Also, it defines issues related to weakness of legislation in conducting 
defense planning and contains an analysis of establishment of structure of the MDU and 
the GS. Basis on this chapter, suggestions were made about necessary changes in 
legislation, personnel, and military structure. 
The third chapter describes word practice approaching of the DR according to the 
British and the United States’ experiences. Also it showed analysis of the conducting of 
the Ukrainian DR and defines the range of problems which exists in recommendations 
about the organization and conduct of the defense review in the MDU. For efficiently 
conducting the DR, non-government institutions and foreign assistances should be 
involved as well as defense agencies. 
The fourth chapter discusses the interdependence of budget and defense programs 
and analyzes the execution of resource planning. In addition, it describes the problem of 
planning activity by providing special fund financing. This chapter defines reasons for 
the suggestion about restructuring the defense program. 
The evolution of the IAS “Resource,” the causes for its failure, and possibilities 
for it future development are contained in the fifth chapter. This chapter concludes that 
the IAS “Resource” is necessary not as software to support defense planning or decision-
making process, but a tool for force management. 
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The sixth chapter contains recommendations about legislation changes, provides 
proposition related to changes in human resources and institutional structure, defines 
defense program restructuration, states a set of the major forces programs and project 
integrity. Finally, the conclusion contains main results, the structure of the study, and a 
recommendation for future research. 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Defense planning became more effective given the following requirements: focus 
on the outputs, the evaluation of cost-effectiveness, planning transparency, etc. It is 
necessary to provide significant effort in purging the Soviet Union legacy, shifting from 
the Eastern pattern to the Western one.  
Besides issues that rose in this work, the first suggestion for further research 
would be to edit the law About the Organization of Defense Planning, and provide 
defense planning in the other military organizations as well. 
The next suggestion would be to study most deep world practice of conducting 
the DR and make suggestions for it in defense and security sphere of Ukraine, involving 
foreign experts. 
Another suggestion is to fully analyze the set of IASs in the AFU. The IAS 
“Resource” should be further developed and should have a set of requirements for 
subsystems of the IAS “Resource,” that should be given by the Departments and 
Directorates of the MDU and the GS and commanders of units of the AFU.  
Finally, the wide sector for future research is the development of indicators of 
program evaluation. Although the budget planning system has some indicators, defense 
planning has no reasonable indicators. 
This study is not going to provide a methodology or model for defense planning. 
Any algorithm could address defense planning. However, the aim of this research is to 
increase the efficiency and quality of defense planning.  
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APPENDIX A.  FINANCIAL RESOURCES DURING 2006–2011 
Sources 
Expenditure, million hryvna 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Decree of the CMU About the 
Forecast of the Consolidated 
Budget of Ukraine by Main 
Types of Revenues, 
Expenditures and Financing 
for the Years 2005–2007235 
5,950.89 6,577.25     
Decree of the CMU About the 
Forecast of the Consolidated 
Budget of Ukraine by Main 
Types of Revenues, 
Expenditures and Financing 
for the Years 2006–2008 and 
long-term prospect236 
7,451.2 8,789.8 10,466.4    
Decree of the CMU About the 
Forecast of the Consolidated 
Budget of Ukraine by Main 
Types of Revenues, 
Expenditures and Financing 
for the Years 2007–2009237 
 7,508.2 8,713.7 10,082.5   
                                                 
235 Cabinet Ministry of Ukraine, Decree on September 9, 2003, № 1427, About the Forecast of the 
Consolidated Budget of Ukraine by Main Types of Revenues, Expenditures and Financing for the Years 
2005–2007. http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1427-2003-%D0%BF/page. 
236 Cabinet Ministry of Ukraine, Decree on September 14, 2004, № 1202, About the Forecast of the 
Consolidated Budget of Ukraine by Main Types of Revenues, Expenditures and Financing for the Years 
2006–2008 and long-term prospect. http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1202-2004-%D0%BF. 
237 Cabinet Ministry of Ukraine, Decree on September 14, 2005, № 913, About the Forecast of the 




Expenditure, million hryvna 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Decree of the CMU About the 
Forecast of the Consolidated 
Budget of Ukraine by Main 
Types of Revenues, 
Expenditures and Financing 
for the Years 2008–2010238 
  10,468.9 12,429.1 14,571.4  
Decree of the CMU About the 
Forecast of the Consolidated 
Budget of Ukraine by Main 
Types of Revenues, 
Expenditures and Financing 
for the Years 2009–2011239 
No data 
The State Program of 
Development of the Armed 
Forces of Ukraine for 2006–
2011 
8,748.4 10,283.4 11,835.6 13,044.8 14,140.3 15,368.6 
Financed240 6,445.5 8,162.2 9,472.8 8,356.0 10,538.7 12,706.0 
Underfinanced of the State 
Program 2,302.9 2,121.2 2,362.8 4,688.8 3,601.6 2,662.6 
 
                                                 
238 Cabinet Ministry of Ukraine, Decree on September 25, 2006, № 1359, About the Forecast of the 
Consolidated Budget of Ukraine by Main Types of Revenues, Expenditures and Financing for the Years 
2008–2010. http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1359-2006-%D0%BF. 
239 Cabinet Ministry of Ukraine, Decree on October 10, 2007, № 1216, About the Forecast of the 
Consolidated Budget of Ukraine by Main Types of Revenues, Expenditures and Financing for the Years 
2009–2011. http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1216-2007-%D0%BF. 
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MDU Ministry of Defense of Ukraine 
CMU Cabinet of Ministries of Ukraine 
GS General Staff of Armed Forces of Ukraine 
MIAU Ministry of Interior Affair of Ukraine 
MREO Military Registration and Enlistment Office 
NGU National Guard of Ukraine 
SBSU State Border Services of Ukraine 
SSESU State Service of Emergency Situation of Ukraine 
SSSCISU State Service of Special Communication and Information Security of Ukraine 
NSDCU National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine 
SSU Security Service of Ukraine 
VRU Verchovna Rada of Ukraine 
Management 
centers 
The centers of the operational groups that were established to respond or when the threat of aggression by the bodies of the SSU, 
the antiterrorist center of the SSU, the operational groups of the MDU, other  working groups, anticrisis groups, databases centers in 




MIAU, SBSU, SSU, SSSCISU, SSESU, Ministry of Health Protection of Ukraine, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade 
of Ukraine, Ministry of Agricultural of Ukraine, Housing and Communal Services 
 
- input data 
 
- information exchange  
 
           - administration access                    - necessary to link up with IAS “Resource” 
                   - necessary to link up with database of IAS “Resource” 
 
1. Military units 
2. Tactical level 
 
3. Operational level 
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